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From the presidency *of George Washington until the recent unanimous decision in United States v. Nixon 1 there was uncertainty about the nature and extent of the duty of the Executive Branch to furnish information to the Congress on the one
hand and to the courts on the other. Occasionally Presidents
asserted a right to withhold information either for themselves
or on behalf of their subordinates, and the claim came to be
known as "executive privilege." During the past two years the
problem has been dramatized by controversies growing out of
demands upon President Nixon by the Watergate Special Prosecutor, the Senate Select (Ervin) Committee on Presidential
t Williston Professor, Harvard University. A.B. 1934, LL.B. 1937, Harvard University. Member, Massachusetts Bar. Mr. Cox was the Watergate Special Prosecutor
from May to October, 1973.
This article is an elaboration and updating of the tenth annual Owen J. Roberts
Lecture, delivered at the University of Pennsylvania on March 26, 1974. The substantive revisions take account of the supervening decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
The author acknowledges the assistance of Miss Kendra E. Heymann in research
for the Roberts Lecture. Also, he wishes to remind the reader that his views may be
colored by past advocacy despite an effort to achieve detachment; he obtained the
initial subpoena for Watergate tapes and filed briefs and presented argument for
enforcement in two courts.
' 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
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Campaign Activities, and the House Committee on the Judiciary in the consideration of resolutions calling for impeachment.
United States v. Nixon puts some questions to rest. The decision establishes the legal duty of even a President to furnish
evidence of what was said in conversations with his closest aides
when relevant to the trial of a criminal cause. The decision also
helps by analogy to define the proper method of dealing with
claims of executive privilege in other judicial proceedings. It
may profoundly influence the development of legislative and
executive practice when a congressional body seeks information which the Executive would prefer to withhold.
Even though United States v. Nixon will henceforth supply
the premises for most discussions of executive privilege, the
issues are best understood and the decision put in perspective
by starting from the beginning, as if the slate were clean.'
I.

THE PROBLEM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

The Constitution says nothing about the right of either
the courts or the Congress to obtain documents, inter- or intradepartmental memoranda, or testimony about oral communications within the Executive Branch. Nor does the Constitution
speak directly or indirectly about a privilege to withhold. The
controversy over executive privilege arises from our constitutional separation of government into coordinate legislative, executive and judicial branches.
Consider first the Judicial Branch. Charged with adjudicating cases and controversies and with supervising grand jury
investigations, the Judicial Branch has obvious need of evidence and therefore the implied authority to issue compulsory
legal process for securing it. The need may occasionally ex2 The disputes, practices and judicial decisions prior to March 6, 1958, are collected in a memorandum submitted by Attorney General Rogers in Hearing on S. 921
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 33-146 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing]; see note 54
infra. A devastating critique of the statement is Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry (pts. I & 2), 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1044, 1288 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Berger]. These articles were recently revised and brought up to date. See R. BERGER,
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (1974) [hereinafter cited as BERGER]. See also, Wiggin§, Government Operations and the Public's Right to Know, 19 FED. B.J. 62 (1959). Executive
practice and the resulting questions of policy during the Eisenhower administration
are reviewed in Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-1960
(pts. 1 & 2), 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 827 (1961). For a recent discussion, see Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1974).
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tend to evidence in the possession of the President or his subordinates in the Executive Branch. The best opinion at AngloAmerican law has always been that no man except the King is
wholly free from the testimonial duty to give evidence required
in the administration of justice.3 In the treason case against
Aaron Burr, Chief justice Marshall ruled that this obligation
extends to the President. 4 On this theory, the federal district
court would seem to have had legal power to require President
Nixon's testimony concerning relevant and unprivileged matters within his knowledge, although the Special Prosecutor
chose not to press the issue. The public interest in a President's
attention to other duties would doubtless make it appropriate
to excuse him in instances in which his testimony was unessential and otherwise to take it by deposition. Various privileges
to withhold evidence- might or might not be applicable. The
important point is that the powers vested in the Judicial Branch
under article III of the Constitution logically extend to issuing
orders for the production of material evidence by the President
and other officers in the Executive Branch.
The Legislative Branch-the Senate and the House of Representatives-also requires information, in order to enact laws
and appropriate funds for the conduct of the government. Article I's grant of power to legislate is therefore held to carry implied authority to summon witnesses and to compel the production of evidence. 5 Since much of the evidence must come from
the Executive Branch, especially when its activities are under
scrutiny, the implied power of Congress under article I logically
3 Jeremy Bentham gave this vivid illustration:

Are men of the first rank and consideration-are men high in office-men
whose time is not less valuable to the public than to themselves-are such
men to be forced to quit their business, their functions, or what is more than
all, their pleasure, at the beck of every idle or malicious adversary, to dance
attendance upon every petty cause? Yes, as far as it is necessary, they and
everybody. . . . Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury,
and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach, while a
chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the chimney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to
think proper to call upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No,
most certainly.
4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320-21 (U. Bowring ed. 1962); see United States v.
Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3107-10 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655, 688 (1972);
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2192, 2369-70 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1927); cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1383

extends to requiring the production of evidence by executive
officials.
The Executive Branch, on the other hand, has an undeniably legitimate interest, at least under some circumstances, in
preserving the confidentiality of internal communications in
order to perform its duties under article II. Revealing specifications for, or locations of strategic military weapons could
hazard national security. Disclosing diplomatic secrets might
endanger negotiations vitally affecting national interests. Confidentiality also may be important to effective consultation. In
1955 President Eisenhower said:
But when it comes to the conversations that take
place between any responsible official and his advisers
• . . expressing personal opinions on the most confidential basis, those are not subject to investigation by
anybody; and if they are, will wreck the Government.
There is no business that could be run if there
would be exposed every single thought that an adviser
might have, because in the process of reaching an
agreed position, there are many, many conflicting
opinions to be brought together. And if any commander is going to get the free, unprejudiced opinions of his subordinates, he had better protect
what
6
they have to say to him on a confidential basis.
The claim was made in very general terms applicable not
only to presidential conversations and papers but also to papers
and conversations throughout. the Executive Branch.7 And
from the need for confidentiality as an encouragement of candor it is argued that "[t]he same logic which holds that Congress
has the power to investigate so that it may effectively exercise
its legislative functions, supports the proposition that the President has the power to withhold information when the use of
the power is necessary to exercise his Executive functions effectively . ..."I
Standing by itself each inference seems not only logical but
necessary. The Judicial Branch, when it needs evidence, should
have the power to obtain it. The Legislative Branch, when it
6 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED

HOWER (1955), at 674.
8

Senate Hearing,supra note 2, at 271-77.
Kramer & Marcuse, supra note 2, at 899.

STATES,

DWIGHT D.
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needs information in order to perform its duties, should also
have power to obtain it. Yet the Executive, when disclosure of
information will impede the performance of its duties, should
have power to withhold it. The third inference cuts across the
first and second. In any given situation either the first or second, or the third, must yield. The questions are: (1) who, if anyone, shall decide which shall yield and when it shall yield; and
(2) on what basis shall the decision, if any, be rendered.
II.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Prior to the decision in United States v. Nixon, it was possible to argue that the Chief Executive had absolute power to decide for himself and his subordinates what information should
be withheld from the Legislative or Judicial Branch. The argument usually took as its premise some carefully selected definition of the theory of the separation of powers from which the
conclusion of an executive privilege to withhold documents
could be extrapolated. For example, Judge Wilkey, dissenting
in Nixon v. Sirica,9 chose a passage from the opinion of Justice
Sutherland in Humphrey's Executor v. United States:
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of
the three general departments of government entirely
free from the control or coercive influence, direct or
indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed
and is hardly open to serious question .... The sound
application of a principle that makes one master in his
own house precludes him from imposing his control in
the house of another who is master there. 10
"If the Chief Executive can be 'coerced' by the Judicial Branch
into furnishing records," the argument ran, "then the Chief Executive is no longer 'master in his own house,'" and this is contrary to the stated constitutional postulate. 11
The reasoning seems unpersuasive for two reasons:
(1) The premise assumes the conclusion. One can just as
well say that the Judiciary will not be master in its house and the
9487 F.2d 700, 762, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This decision was entered upon appeal
of an order enforcing the first subpoena for Watergate tapes, which was issued during
the grand jury investigation. President Nixon did not seek certiorari. The Supreme
Court decision, United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974), was upon the validity
of a subsequent subpoena seeking additional tapes for use upon trial of the indictment.
10 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
" Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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Congress not master in its house if the President can decide
what evidence is available in judicial or legislative proceedings.
Montesquieu and Locke argued that power should be divided,
but in making this central point against the monolithic government of Louis XIV they had no need to concern themselves
with problems involving two or more branches that required
12
exact definition of the boundaries of each.
(2) Interaction, not independence, has historically been
characteristic of the operation of the three branches of our government.1 3 The enactments of the Legislative Branch, unless
unconstitutional, bind the Judiciary not only in the decision of
particular cases and controversies but also in the very procedure through which the Judiciary transacts its business. 14 The
Legislature regularly imposes legal duties upon the Executive. 5
The Judiciary gives effect to executive orders.16 The Judiciary
can check unconstitutional action by either the Executive or
17
Legislative Branch.
For much the same reason there was nothing persuasive in
the assertion of counsel to President Nixon that "a holding that
the President is personally subject to the orders of a court would
effectively destroy the status of the Executive Branch as an
equal and coordinate element of government."1 8
From the earliest days of the Republic the courts have issued orders addressed to high executive officials requiring
them to comply with the Constitution and laws as judicially interpreted, even when their wrongful acts are done by explicit
2

See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 28-30 (1965).
'3 The opinion of the Court, 94 S. Ct. at 3107, quotes Justice Jackson's earlier observation that "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty,
it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
' 4 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2519, 3006A, 3331(a), 6003(a), 6005(a) (1970); 28 id. §§
2, 44(c), 45, 47, 48, 134(b), 144, 331-33, 455, 1731-45, 1826(b), 1863, 2102, 2254(b),
2284(4), 2403.
'5 Article II, section 3 of the Constitution makes it the duty of the President to
'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Congress makes the laws. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 1.
H6See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Letter Carriers v. Austin, 94 S. Ct.
2770 (1974); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
1'See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18 Brief in Opposition at 3, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon,
360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
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presidential command.' The most dramatic example is the
Steel Seizure case of 1952, in which the Judicial Branch required Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to return to the private
owners the steel mills he had seized upon President Truman's
direction in order to terminate a labor dispute in time of war. 20
No one doubted that it was the President whose legal duties
were being determined, or that he was bound by the adjudication. To recognize presidential power to defeat the legal process
merely by substituting the President's person for the person of
the customary subordinate would not only exalt form over substance but also confer a king-like prerogative to set aside the
laws according to the Executive's will-whether actuated by
wise judgment, whim or self-interest. 21 It seems hardly surpris1"E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Kendall
v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d
623 (D.C. Cir. 1951), vacated as moot, 344 U.S. 806 (1952). See also, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21 The opposing view was seriously pressed-by Attorney General Stanbery in Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), a suit by the state of Mississippi to
enjoin execution of various reconstruction acts imposing military government upon
the defeated confederate states. In order to make the point that the President is "above
the process of any court," Stanbery was forced to claim for the President a royal
prerogative:
... I deny that there is a particle less dignity belonging to the office of
President than to the office of King of Great Britain or of any other potentate on the face of the earth. He represents the majesty of the law and of the
people as fully and as essentially, and with the same dignity, as does any absolute monarch or the head of any independent government in the world.
Id. at 484. Because the Court dismissed the bill without reaching the merits, some
writers have concluded that the President is as immune from the process as the Attorney General claimed. See, e.g., C. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION § 50, at 125-27 (1922); 3 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 979-80, at 1497-1500 (2d ed. 1929). The opinion of the Court,
however, carefully disclaimed decision upon the assertion of total presidential immunity
from process. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 498. The Court held that it had "no jurisdiction of a bill
to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties," id. at 501,
distinguishing the power of the courts to require the President to perform a single
ministerial act from power to control the exercise of his broad constitutional discretion.
Subsequently, the Court declined jurisdiction of similar bills naming the Secretary of War or a military commander as respondent. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 50 (1867). Their disposition is further proof that it was the character of the
question presented and not the identity of the respondent that determined the issue in Mississippi v. Johnson. Because this analysis is scarcely consistent with the modern view that an unconstitutional course of conduct may be enjoined because the
officer is in that event exceeding the scope of this office, later cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized explicitly that the Johnson decision did not turn on the
fact that the respondent was the President, treat the ruling as an early expression of
the nonjusticiability of "political questions." Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401
U.S. 493, 496 (1971); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); Louisiana v.

1390

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1383

ing that counsel's argument that the President is not subject to
legal process was rejected initially by both Judge Sirica and the
23
Court of Appeals 22 and ultimately by the Supreme Court.
Nor does it seem important that the court lacks physical power to coerce the President. Our constitutional tradition rightly relies upon the moral and political force of law.
Throughout our history the courts have issued decrees against
states, 24 the employees of Congress,2 5 federal executive officials,2 6 and the United States, 27 all of which the judiciary lacked
physical power to enforce. Long ago the Supreme Court observed that, when confronted with a judicial question, "we cannot decline the exercise of our jurisdiction upon the inadmissible suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies
in disregard of the judgment .... "28 The essential soundness
of that position is demonstrated by the "firestorm"-to borrow
a phrase from General Haig-which blew up over the weekend
of October 20-21, 1973, and which forced President Nixon to
reverse his announced decision to disobey the initial order for
production of Watergate tapes.
We should note finally the relatively modest argument
once offered by Chief Justice Taft. From the very fact of the
tripartite separation of powers, he said, it is to be inferred "that
the branches should be kept separate in all cases in which they
were not expressly blended, and the Constitution should be
McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 633-34 (1914); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265,
296 (1888). Recent cases in the lower courts indicate that the President can be named
a defendant in an action when that course would be necessary to the granting of effective relief. See Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci, 358 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C.
1973); Meyers v. Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Atlee v. Nixon, 336 F.
Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1972); FED. R. Cxv. P. 19(a).
The opinion in United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. at 3106-07, does not deal with the
question explicitly, probably because the Supreme Court briefs for President Nixon
avoided any sweeping claim of presidential immunity from judicial process.
22
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1973), aff'd as modified, Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
22 United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
24E.g., South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318-21 (1904).
25 E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969).
26 E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2'E.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 571 (1962); United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196 (1882). A portion of the opinion in Mississippi v. Johnson seems to suggest that the bill was beyond the Coures jurisdiction because the Court could not, in
the final analysis, enforce its will against the President. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 500-01.
Those passages should be read as part of the explanation of the impossibility of dictating to the President how he was to perform a wide range of discretionary functions; otherwise, they run contrary to this entire tradition in our constitutional law.
28 McPherson v. Blackber, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892).
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expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires.1 29 Chief Justice Taft does not say why this inference is
warranted. In the case of the Executive the presumption runs
contrary to the basic reason for the separation of powers:
The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by
the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but
to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among three departments, to save the
people from autocracy.3
But this too is a selected quotation not wholly demonstrable as
historical truth.
In sum, if one selects with care an authoritative generalization about the separation of powers, he can extrapolate any desired conclusion concerning executive privilege. If one has no
predisposition, theorizing about the separation of powers provides no reliable guide upon the exact point. Taken more broadly, constitutional tradition plainly sustains judicial rulings upon
the legality of acts of the Executive.
IllI.

HISTORIC PRACTICE

Although history clarifies some aspects of the problem, it
ultimately does little more than political theory to resolve the
controversy over executive privilege. The very few directly pertinent statements by members of the Constitutional Convention
assert the absence of any presidential privilege. James Wilson,
for example, told the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention:
The executive power is better to be trusted when it has
no screen. Sir, we have a responsibility in the person of
our President; he cannot act improperly, and hide
either his negligence or inattention; he cannot roll
upon any other person the weight of his criminality
....
Add to all this, that officer is placed high, and is
possessed of power far from being contemptible, yet
not a single privilege is annexed to his character ......
Yet Jefferson's memoirs record that after the ill-fated St.
Clair expedition, Washington and his cabinet agreed that the
29

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926).

30 Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE

SEVERAL STATE

CONVENTIONS

ON THE ADOP-
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Chief Executive had discretion to withhold papers from Congress when he believed it to be in the public interest. Whether
their agreement is significant is open to dispute; in fact, Washington did supply all the papers requested.32
In examining later events it is convenient to separate judicial from legislative proceedings. It is also necessary to consider
the relation first of the Judiciary and then of the Congress to
each of the other two branches, because in Nixon v. Sirica Judges
MacKinnon and Wilkey, dissenting, argued that each branch
had historically asserted that the doctrine of the separation of
powers gave it the right to keep its proceedings confidential
33
from the others.
A. Judicial Proceedings
1. Executive Privilege
From the beginning the courts have exercised the right to
decide what papers they should require from the Executive
Branch for use in the administration of justice. The Executive
has sometimes denied the right, but it has always acquiesced in
judicial orders. In the Burr case Chief Justice Marshall ruled
very clearly that there is judicial power to require the President
to produce evidence, although he hedged a bit upon what he
would do if the President asserted that the public interest required him to hold the matter confidential. 34 President Jefferson denied the court's power but he "voluntarily" sent the document along to the U.S. Attorney, who turned over less than
Burr desired but enough to dissuade him from pressing the issue so far as to require further rulings or orders.3 " In 1818 PresTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (2d ed. 1836). Charles Pinckney stated in the
Senate on March 5, 1800:

[The framers) well knew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges
had been exercised in Great Britain, and were determined no such authority

should ever be exercised here ....
• . . No privilege of this kind was intended for your Executive, nor any
except that which I have mentioned for your Legislature.
3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 385 (1911).

32BERGER, supra note 2, at 168; Berger, supra note 2, at 1080.
11 487 F.2d at 730-42 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting); id. at 768-73 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
3' United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34-35 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
5 Id. (No. 14,694) at 190-93. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 785 & n.120, 787
& n.128 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE

L.J. 1111, 1115-19 (1974).
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ident Monroe was subpoenaed to testify in a military court and
36
gave evidence by written answers to interrogatories.
Those are the only occasions prior to Watergate on which
the question arose with respect to the President,3 7 but even before Nixon v. Sirica and United States v. Nixon there was a substantial body of law holding that the courts would require the
production of departmental records and papers under appropriate circumstances, including a recent Supreme Court deci38
sion covering copies of documents prepared for the President.
The decisions asserted the power to enforce the rulings by legal process. 3 " The executive officials complied. Insofar as presidential claims of executive privilege rest upon the tripartite
separation of powers, there is no basis for distinguishing presidential papers from other papers in the Executive Branch.
2.

Legislative Privilege

The Senate and the House of Representatives have asserted the privilege of deciding for themselves when to supply
evidence in a judicial proceeding, but the fourteen instances
most often cited throw no significant light upon either the separation of powers or executive privilege. 40 Five of the fourteen
grew out of summonses to individual Congressmen to appear
36 In January, 1818, President Monroe was summoned to appear as a defense
witness in the court martial of Dr. William Burton. Attorney General's Papers: Letters Received from State Department, Record Group 60, National Archives Building;
Records of the Office of Judge Advocate General (Navy), Record Group 125 (Records
of General Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry, Microcopy M-272, case 282), National Archives Building. These documents are cited in 487 F.2d at 710 n.42.
'7 Associate Justice Chase refused a subpoena to obtain President Adams' testimony during the trial of Thomas Cooper for libel, United States v. Cooper, 25 F.
Cas. 631 (No. 14,865) (C.C.D. Pa. 1800), not because the President is immune from
process (which Justice Chase denied) but because Cooper was not allowed to prove
the truth of the alleged libel by the testimony of the President, the victim. T. COOPER,
AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL OF THOMAS COOPER, OF NORTHUMBERLAND; ON A CHARGE
OF LIBEL AGAINST THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 10 (1800).
38 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See also cases cited id. at 88 & nn.14-15.
3' United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 465-66 (1951); id. at 472
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Westinghouse

Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351

F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F,2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 896 (1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1960); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2019, at 171-72
(1970).
40
The 14 instances canvassed are taken from 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE
OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2660-64, 2666, at 1110-1115, 1116
(1907) [hereinafter cited as HINDS' PRECEDENTS] and from the dissenting opinions
OF REPRESENTATIVES

in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 738-40, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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and testify. The right to refuse was not asserted upon the basis
of the separation of powers but as a privilege of freedom from
coerced attendance at another place while Congress is in session. 41 This constitutional ground was also taken in a sixth instance when the House directed the members of the House
committee that recommended the impeachment of Secretary of
War Belknap not to comply with subpoenas duces tecum requiring the production of documentary evidence for use in a bribery prosecution. The practical ground of opposition to compliance was that release of the evidence would interfere with the
integrity of the impeachment proceedings.4 2
Seven more cases involved documents rather than attendance. Typically the House or Senate, as the case might be, espoused two propositions: (a) no employee may produce the records of either house without its consent-a rule paralleling the
settled principle that the head of an executive department may
forbid subordinates to open departmental files without his permission; 43 (b) each house has the exclusive right to determine
when it will permit use of its papers as evidence. 44 In one early
case the papers were furnished. 45. In four cases copies were ten41 The earliest instance appears to have arisen during the trial of Thomas Cooper
for seditious libel in 1800. Members of Congress were subpoenaed and testified under a waiver of privilege. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 633-34 (No. 14,865)
(C.C.D. Pa. 1800). In 1846 the House of Representatives rejected a resolution that
would have authorized members to waive the privilege individually but voted to give
a subpoenaed member permission to respond to a subpoena in a criminal proceeding. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 767-69 (1846). The House took similar action
on March 21, 1876. 4 CONG. REc. (1876); 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 40, § 2662,
at 1112. In later cases Senator Blease and Representative LaGuardia disregarded subpoena in the absence of authorizing resolutions. 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE
HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, § 586, at 825 1936) [hereinafter
cited as CANNON'S PRECEDENTS]; 72 CONG. REC. 109 (1929).
42 4 CONG. REC. 1525, 1539 (1876). Representative Cox, for example, described
the privilege in these words:
What is the reason for this rule of our action? Simply this: that a Representative who represents a large body of people, or a Senator who represents
a State, should not be called by the courts at their pleasure to leave their
seats. He holds superior allegiance ....
The object of a privilege of this kind
is that the public business shall go on. Public duty is paramount to all your
police courts and with all their attachments and subpoenas duces tecum.
Id. 1530.
43The leading case sustaining a departmental regulation is Boske v. Comingore,
177 U.S. 459 (1900). Recognition of the power of a cabinet officer to reserve decision
unto himself does not imply that the papers are privileged. United States ex rel. Touhy
v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 465-66 (1951); id. at 472 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
44 See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 1295 (1886); 9 id. 680-81 (1879).
41 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 89 (1842).
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dered. 46 In two cases the originals were refused without more,
but there is every reason to suppose that copies would have
been supplied if requested.

47

The fourteenth and last instance grew out of the attempt
of Lieutenant Calley to subpoena secret testimony given during
an investigation by the House Armed Services Committee which
preceded the court martial. Article I, section 5 gives each house
an express privilege to keep secret the journal of its proceedings. The military court ruled that this privilege covers the
proceedings of congressional committees. Production of the
testimony was refused.48
It seems apparent that none of these refusals throws light
upon executive privilege. Neither the express privilege to keep
the journal secret, nor the express grant of immunity from arrest, 4:1 nor the ancient parliamentary privilege to be in attendance during sessions " applies to the President. If any inference is to be drawn, it is that the contrasts between article II and
article III show that the President is to have no privilege. Neither
the House nor the Senate has ever persisted, upon the basis
of the separation of powers, in a refusal of evidence needed in
a judicial proceeding.
B. Legislative Proceedings
1. Executive Privilege
Senate and House Committees and less often the Senate
and House themselves have been demanding information from
46 61 CONG. REC. 5572-73 (1921); 17 id. 1295 (1886); 9 id. 680 (1879).

47 108 CONG. REC. 3626-27 (1962); 68 id. 4031-34 (1927). The former instance
grew out of a prosecution of James R. Hoffa.
48 116 CONG. REC. 37,652-53 (1970).
4.1U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. The privilege of nonattendance at court while Congress
is in session has sometimes been traced to this provision. For example, in 1929 Judge
Gordon addressed a grand jury upon Senator Blease's failure to respond to a subpoena in these terms:
The Congress of the United States is now in session....
Section 6, Article I of the Constitution of the United States, gives immunity to arrest to the Members of Congress while that body is in session.
It does not say that they are privileged from subpoena, but if they do not
obey, the only step the court could take would be to issue an attachment for
their arrest. Since the Constitution provides immunity from arrest, in my
opinion they are not subject to such action.
6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 41, § 588, at 828.

50 Since the seventeenth century the House of Commons has claimed immunity
for its members from attendance in court during sessions of Parliament. In modern
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the Executive Branch since the administration of George Washington. Nearly always the requests were satisfied, but one finds
interspersed through history occasions on which Presidents declined to comply with congressional requests. Some of the refusals were accompanied by messages asserting a very broad
presidential discretion to withhold any papers or other material
the President thinks it in the public interest to withhold. Some
Attorneys General gave opinions supporting the claim.51 . Some
Senators and Representatives and some committee reports acquiesced in the claim. Others resisted it. One of the attacks upon
executive privilege is worth quoting:
That would mean that the President could have arbitrarily issued an Executive order in the Meyers case,
the Teapot Dome case, or any other case denying the
Congress of the United States information it needed to
conduct an investigation of the executive department
and the Congress would have no right to question his
decision.
Any such order of the President can be questioned
by the Congress as to2 whether or not that order is justified on the merits.
The words were spoken by the then-Congiessman Richard M.
Nixon.
Historians; judges and lawyers differ over the proper description and analysis of these incidents. All ended inconclusively because there was not in the past and may not be today
any method of resolving the conflict short of impeachment. "3
One gets a useful picture of the kinds of occasions on which information has been withheld by Chief Executives, however, by
classifying each of the twenty-seven occasions listed in a purportedly complete compilation of prior claims of executive privtimes, the parliamentary privilege has been invoked by a Member of Parliament who
went on to become Prime Minister-Harold Wilson. In 1953, ithen Mr. Wilson was
subpoenaed to attend and testify in High Court, he called upon the Speaker of the
House for assistance. The Speaker addressed a letter to the judge in the case, requesting that he set aside the subpoena, in order to "obviate the necessity for this House
to take the formal and more cumbrous step of refusing leave of absence from the
House for the Right Hon. Gentleman to attend the court that day, in view of the fact
that Members of both Houses are, by law and custom of Parliament, exempted from
attendance as witnesses during the sessions of Parliament." P. PACHAURI, THE LAW
OF PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES IN U.K. AND IN INDIA 193 (1971).
'

40 Op. ATr'y GEN. 45 (1941); 11 id. 137, 142-43 (1865); cf. 25 id. 326 (1905).

52 94 CONG. REC. 4783 (1948).
13

See part V, infra.
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Eisenilege made by the Department of Justice under President
54
hower, not by what was said, but by what was done.
At the very outset four of the seventeen Presidents and five
of the twenty-seven instances compiled must be stricken from
the list upon the ground that the congressional request explicitly stated that the President should decide whether furnishing
the papers would be in the public interest. "5 In these instances
there was no need for a claim of constitutional right because
there was no resistance to a congressional demand. President
Jefferson, for example, is often said to have claimed executive
privilege in withholding from the House information regarding.
the Burr conspiracy. The House request shows on its face that
the House asked for information "except such as [the President]
56
may deem the public welfare to require not to be disclosed.
54 Memorandum submitted in 1958 by Attorney General William Rogers, Senate
Hearing, supra note 2, at 63-146. The memorandum is only a slight revision, without
updating, of an unofficial memo prepared by Justice Department attorney Herman
Wolkinson in 1947, and published as Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees
for Executive Papers, (parts 1 & 2), 10 FED. B.J. 103, 223 (1949). See Senate Hearing,
supra note 2, at 32-33. The Wolkinson material also became a major source document
for the statement of the Justice Department accompanying President Eisenhower's
letter to the Secretary of Defense of May 17, 1954. See Brownell, Memorandum on Separation of Powers, 14 FED. B.J. 73 (1954). Judge MacKinnon relied upon these documents, apparently without further check, for his dissenting opinion in Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700, 732 n.9 (1973).
55The instances which should be stricken upon this ground involved Presidents
Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, Millard Fillmore, Abraham Lincoln, and Herbert
Hoover:
(1) The incident involving Jefferson is described in the text.
(2) In January 1825 James Monroe was asked by the House for information about
the misconduct of naval officers. The resolution is not reported in the Annals of Congress, but the wording of Monroe's reply indicates that the House requested the information only "if such a communication might now be made consistently with the public
interest or with justice to the parties concerned." 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 278 (J. Richardson ed. 1898) (hereinafter cited as RICHARDSON]. If Monroe's paraphrase of the request is inaccurate or if I misread it, still the incident would
fall into the category of withholding investigative files relating to wrongdoing or loyalty
and security. See text accompanying notes 61-67 infra.
(3) In 1852, Millard Fillmore was requested to inform the Senate about a proposed transfer of the Sandwich Islands, "if not incompatible with the public interests."
5 id. 139-40.
(4) In March 1861 Congress formally petitioned President Lincoln for the dispatches of Major Robert Anderson to the War Department during his command of
Fort Sumter, "if in his opinion not incompatible with the public interest." CONG. GLOBE,
36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1498 (1861).
(5) A resolution of May 1932 requiring Herbert Hoover to furnish information
on the importation of ammonium sulphate was amended to contain the phrase, "if
not incompatible with the public interest." 75 CoNG. REC. 10,207 (1932).
56 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 336 (1806-07) (discussed in Berger, supra note 2, at 1093
& Wolkinson, supra note 54, at 110-11).
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In a sixth instance the request was by the House for information which a statute explicitly authorized the President to
keep secret. 5 7 In a seventh the information was actually shown
to any Senator who would give a pledge of secrecy.581 Neither
situation required assertion of a constitutional privilege to withhold relevant information.
A number of Presidents withheld information from the
Senate or House as a method of challenging the power of the
particular body to deal with the subject matter upon which the
information was said to bear. Analytically, these cases have no
bearing upon any possible privilege of executive secrecy with respect to matters admittedly within the jurisdiction of the House
making the demand. The most notable example is George
Washington's firm declination in 1796 to deliver to the House
of Representatives documents pertaining to the negotiation of
the Jay Treaty. Washington relied in his rebuff of the House,
not upon the need for secrecy but upon the principle that the
Constitution assigns no role to the House in relation to treaties.
All the papers requested by the House were "in fact ... laid before the Senate," to aid that body in the performance of its legitimate role in the treaty-making function.-" :
Into this category also fall the controversies precipitated by
the several refusals of Presidents Jackson, Tyler, Hayes and
57 In 1846 President James K. Polk was asked by House resolution for the details
of foreign payments that had been made by the preceding administration. Polk pointed
out that a specific statute, the Act of Congress of May 1, 1810, expressly authorized
the President to withhold information about these payments. "While this law exists
in full force," he replied, "I feel bound by a high sense of public policy and duty to
observe its provisions and the uniform practice of my predecessors under it." 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 435. See also, A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
47-49 (1973); J. WIGGINs, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 265 (rev. ed. 1964).
58 In 1930 when the Senate requested to see information pertaining to a naval
treaty, President Hoover wrote: "No Senator has been refused an opportunity to see
the confidential material referred to, provided only he will agree to receive and hold
the same in the confidence in which it has been received and held by the Executive."
H. HOOVER, REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT, S. Doc. No. 216, 71st
Cong., Special Sess. 2 (1930). President Hoover's manner of transmitting the information was similar to that of President John Adams in April 1798 when he responded
to a House request for dispatches from the American envoys to France by furnishing the papers along with a "request that they may be considered in confidence until
the members of Congress are fully possessed of their contents, and shall have had the
opportunity to deliberate on the consequences of their publication; after which time
I submit to them your wisdom." The House then considered the papers in secret session. 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 40, § 1898, at 194.
-9 Washington disavowed any disposition to withhold any information which could
be required of him "by either House of Congress as a right," but he added:
It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to
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Cleveland to produce information in connection with either
Senate inquiries into the dismissal of executive officers or
House inquiries into appointments and dismissals. For example, in 1842 President Tyler reminded the House: "The appointing power, so far as it is bestowed on the President by the
Constitution, is conferred without reserve or qualification. The
reason for the appointment and the responsibility of the appointment rest with him alone.

60

any purpose under the cognizance of the House of Representatives, except
that of an impeachment, which the resolution has not expressed....
[ilt is perfectly clear ... that the assent of the House of Representatives is not necessary to the validity of a treaty ....
.I RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 194-96; 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760-61 (1796). See also
Wiggins, supra note 2, at 77-79; Wolkinson, supra note 54, at 107-09.
60 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 106. President Tyler added:
I can not perceive anywhere in the Constitution of the United States any right
conferred on the House of Representatives to hear the reasons which an applicant may urge for an appointment to office under the executive department, or any duty resting upon the House of Representatives by which it may
become responsible for any such appointment.
Id.
Other incidents referred to in the text may be briefly sketched:
(1) Jackson: In 1835 the Senate requested information relating to the dismissal
of an executive official. Jackson replied that since the Senate did not legitimately participate in such removals from office, it was not entitled to information concerning
them. 3 RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 132-34.
In 1837 a House Select Committee demanded that President Jackson and heads
of the executive departments furnish a wide range of information concerning all officers employed during a certain period in the executive branch. Rejecting compliance with their overbroad and vague commands, President Jackson protested that no
specific charges had been made against these officers. Significantly, he expressed a
willingness to comply with any specific request supported by a showing of reason to
suspect wrongdoing. See text accompanying note 75 infra. 13 CONG. DEB., App. at
201-02 (1837).
(2) Hayes: President Hayes clashed with Congress in 1877 when the Senate Committee on Commerce asked for information with respect to the removal of Chester
Arthur from the office of the Collector of the Port of New York. President Hayes refused on the ground of the exclusive power of the President to remove such executive officers. 17 CONG. REC. 2332, 2618 (1886).
(3) Cleveland: When the Senate in 1886 commanded President Cleveland to disclose the reasons for the suspension from office of the U.S. District Attorney for Alabama, the President directed attention to the April 5, 1869 amendment to the Tenure of Office Act, allowing the President to suspend such officers "in his discretion."
President Cleveland declined to deliver the papers
having reference to the performance of a duty exclusively mine. ...
I am also led unequivocally to dispute the right of the Senate by the
aid of any documents whatever, or in any way save through the judicial process of trial on impeachment, to review or reverse the acts of the Executive in
the suspension, during the recess of the Senate, of Federal officials.
8 RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 378-79. The prolonged controversy between Presi-
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President Tyler on one occasion, 6 1 President Franklin D.
Roosevelt on perhaps six occasions 62 and President Truman
dent Cleveland and the Senate, which included the formal censure by that body of
the Attorney General for withholding documents, was mooted when President Cleveland pointed out that the suspended attorney's term had expired. Eventually, Congress confirmed the appointment of his successor. See I R. MCELROY, GROVER CLEVELAND, THE MAN AND THE STATESMAN 171-83 (1923).
61 In 1843 President Tyler responded to a request by the House of Representa-

tives for reports made to the Department of War by Lieutenant Colonel Hitchcock,
who had been designated to investigate the affairs of the Cherokee Indians. Though
he sent the House the desired information, President Tyler appended to it a statement of principle which carefully delineated certain circumstances in which the confidentiality of investigations should be protected. 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 40,
§ 1885, at 181-82; 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 222-25. Of investigations, Presi-

dent Tyler said in part:
To be effective these inquiries must often be confidential. . . . To maintain
that the President can exercise no discretion as to the time in which the matters thus collected shall be promulgated or in respect to the character of the
information obtained would deprive him at once of the means of performing
one of the most salutary duties of his office. An inquiry might be arrested at
its first stage and the officers whose conduct demanded investigation may
be enabled to elude or defeat it....
The officer charged with a confidential inquiry, and who reports its
result under the pledge of confidence which his appointment implies, ought
not to be exposed individually to the resentment of those whose conduct may
be impugned by the information he collects. The knowledge that such is to be
the consequence will inevitably prevent the performance of duties of that
character, and thus the Government will be deprived of an important means
of investigating the conduct of its agents.
Id. 222-23.
62 The incidents involving President Franklin D. Roosevelt were as follows:
(1) In 1941 the House Committee on Naval Affairs demanded to see certain FBI
reports pertaining to investigations of labor disputes in industrial establishments with
naval contracts. Roosevelt bolstered his refusal to furnish the reports with an opinion
by Attorney General Robert H. Jackson. Jackson wrote that if disclosure were permitted,
the national defense would be jeopardized and the FBI crippled through its inability
to retain the trust of its confidential informants. 40 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 45 (1941).
Incidents 2 through 6, though listed separately, all relate to the wartime hearings
held by the House Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications
Commission:
(2) In 1943, the Committee subpoenaed Harold D. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to appear and produce files and correspondence relating to the
proposed transfer of the Radio Intelligence Division from the FCC to the military
departments. Instructions from President Roosevelt and Attorney General Jackson's
Opinion of 1941 were relied upon in refusing to comply with the subpoena. Hearings
Before the House Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications Commission,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 34-39 (1943-44).
(3) A subpoena was issued by the Committee to the Chairman of the FCC (who
was also the Chairman of the Board of War Communications). He declined to supply
the documents demanded by the Committee, because he felt bound by the decision
of the Board of War Communications not to deliver the documents. Id. 46, 51-53.
(4) The General Counsel of the FCC declined to comply with a subpoena because
of the decision of the Board of War Communications not to make the documents which
were subpoenaed available to the committee. Id. 53-54.
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twice 63 withheld investigative files relating to wrongdoing or
loyalty and security. All nine instances can honestly be described as assertions of the confidentiality of papers in the Executive Branch, but it is equally plain that the claim was not
based upon an undifferentiated interest in preserving confidentiality among executive officials. Much that was in the files
would not have been competent evidence in a court. Much
would have been privileged in a court under particular rules
having nothing to do with a generalized claim of confidentiality: as state secrets, 64 under the informer's privilege, 65 or as
work products.6 6 The chief purpose of the withholding was to
(5) The Acting Secretary of War and the Acting Secretary of the Navy also refused, on the direction of the President, to allow documents to be delivered or officers to testify before the Committee. Id. 67-68.
(6) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation also declined to answer
certain questions propounded to him by the committee, a number of which related to
FBI investigations. Id., pt. 2, at 2337-39.
63 President Truman, in 1945, repeatedly directed executive departments and
officers to disclose information to the Joint Congressional, Committee investigation
of the attack on Pearl Harbor. While files and documents were made available to the
Joint Committee, a minority report complained that the President's orders did not
include release to individual members. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, S. Doc. No. 244, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 498-502
(minority report). President Truman otherwise provided for complete access, and the
majority expressed the belief that they had received the "fullest cooperation" from
the President and the Executive Branch. Id. xiv, 283-87 (majority report); see Wolkinson, supra note 54, at 145.
(2) Although we have followed the Department of Justice in counting as a separate
incident the supposed refusal of President Truman in 1947 to furnish Civil Service
Commission records concerning applicants for positions, our research has not disclosed such a refusal. H.R.J. Res. 289, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 38 (1948),
referred to in the Wolkinson article as "the unsuccessful attempt of the House of Representatives to force President Truman to produce civil service records," was "neither
reported out of Committee nor put to a vote of the House." Wolkinson, supra note 54,
at 149 n.*, 256-57 & n.109.
A substitute candidate for Truman's second withholding of information is his directive to the Executive Branch of March 13, 1948, in which he expressed his concern for the confidentiality of results of loyalty investigations of federal employees.
The directive required'that all records relative to the Federal Employee Loyalty Program (which provided for a loyalty investigation of every person entering the civilian
employment of any department or agency of the executive branch) "be preserved in
strict confidence."
This is necessary in the interest of our national security and welfare, to preserve the confidential character and sources of information furnished, and
to protect Government personnel against the dissemination of unfounded or
disproved allegations. It is necessary also in order to insure the fair and just
disposition of loyalty cases.
13 Fed. Reg. 1359 (1948); 94 CONG. REC. 2929, 4777 (1948).
64 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
65 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
66 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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protect possibly innocent persons (latterly those holding unconventional political opinions) against disclosure of the rumors
and loose allegations often found in investigative reports. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson's opinion supporting President Roosevelt's refusal wisely began by limiting the discussion
to investigative files but spoiled the effect by citing precedents
excluding executive papers from evidence upon a wide variety
of grounds.6 7 His bad example set a course for his successors,
especially Attorney General Rogers, and for counsel to President Nixon who jumbled up executive refusals of all kinds. If
it is not too late for historical accuracy and differentiation in
terms of the applicable policies, the investigative files belong in
a separate class. The names of three more Presidents and nine
more incidents should thus be stricken from the list.
Three Presidents found congressional demands for information so motivated by political spite as to refuse compliance:
Buchanfh, Grant and Coolidge. President Buchanan sent two
messages protesting a House resolution setting up a committee
to inquire into whether the President or any other officer of the
government had sought by improper means to influence the
action of Congress on laws relating to the rights of states and
territories. They gave a modicum of historical support to President Nixon's position that the House Judiciary Committee
should have first framed specific charges and then held
hearings at which he would have a right of cross-examination, but there is nothing in the Buchanan messages claiming
an executive privilege of secrecy.68 Nor were Grant 69 and
67 40 Op. ATTeY GEN. 45 (1941).
1S President Buchanan denounced the House investigations as irregular impeachment proceedings, and in his Second Message of Protest, June 22, 1860, he wrote:
I protested against this [resolution] because it was destitute of any specification; because it referred to no particular act to enable the President to prepare
for his defense; because it deprived him of the constitutional guards which,
in common with every citizen of the -United States, he possesses for his protection, and because it assailed his constitutional independence as a coordinate branch of the Government.
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 3299 (1860). But the resolution of the House also

contained a subsequent section asking for information on alleged abuses in post offices, navy yards, and other public works of the United States. President Buchanan
considered these requests for information "highly proper in themselves," and wrote
the House that over such resolutions "their authority as a legislative body is fully and
cheerfully admitted." 5 RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 614-15; CONG. GLOBE 36th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1434 (1860).
69 In 1876, Congress called upon President Grant for information as to which executive acts had been performed at a distance from the seat of government established
by law for a period of seven years. It is clear that the purpose of the request was to
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Coolidge 70 standing upon the latter ground.
Two incidents involving two Presidents remain on the list.
In refusing to send to the Senate a paper which he purportedly
had read to the Cabinet, concerning the removal of funds from
the Bank of the United States, President Jackson wrote:
. I have yet to learn under what constitutional authority that branch of the Legislature has a right to require of me an account of any communication, either
verbally or in writing, made to the heads of Departments acting as a Cabinet council. As well might I be
required to detail to the Senate the free and private
conversations I have held with those officers
on any
71
subject relating to their duties and my own.
In order to keep them from the Senate, President Theodore Roosevelt took into his own possession papers pertaining
to his personal decision not to use the Sherman Act in an effort
to block the United States Steel Corporation's acquisition of the
Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, but he made no formal ex72
position of the grounds for his action.
embarrass Grant for having absented himself from Washington during the hot summers. William Howard Taft recounts:
In the last days of Grant's administration, when the House was Democratic, and when President Grant was being criticized for spending some of
the hot months at Long Branch, the House of Representatives sent him a
resolution asking for information as to how many Executive acts were performed at other places than the seat of government. The inquiry evidently
aroused the General, for his declination to furnish the information is quite
spirited. He declined to admit that under the Constitution he was obliged to
perform official acts at the seat of government, and proceeded to show by
historical reference that many such acts by former Presidents had been performed at other places in the United States.
W.H. TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND His POWERS 130 (1916) (formerly titled OUR CHIEF

MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS). In his reply to the House, Grant emphasized that,
"What the House of Representatives may require as a right in its demand upon the
Executive for information is limited to what is necessary for the proper discharge of
its powers of legislation or of impeachment." 7 RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 362.
70 In 1924 Coolidge protested a Senate committee inquiry into the Bureau of Internal Revenue, when it appeared that the investigation was serving as a vehicle for
venting the personal grievances of Senator Couzens against Secretary of the Treasury
Andrew Mellon. Although Coolidge announced his intention to provide no further
Executive Branch cooperation, it is not clear whether anything was actually withheld
from the Committee. Secretary Mellon himself claimed that he had gone so far as to
obtain waivers of privacy of tax returns from the companies in which he was interested, so that the committee could determine whether the companies had received
favored treatment. 65 CONG. REC. 6087, 6106, 6109 (1924).
6106, 6109 (1924).
71 3 RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 36.
72 Although Roosevelt delivered to the Senate a detailed letter describing the circumstances surrounding his approval of the merger, 43 CONG. REC. 527-28 (1909),
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If this reading of history is fair, four conclusions follow:
(1) Over a period of a century and a half thirteen Presidents found a total of twenty occasions on which to refuse to
turn over information demanded by an arm of Congress. Sometimes Presidents bespoke a broad discretion. Attorneys General
wrote broad opinions to support them.73 Commentators often
74
accepted their views.
(2) If one looks at what was done and confines the words to
the events, nothing appears which even approaches a solid historical practice of recognizing claims of executive privilege
based upon an undifferentiated need for preserving the secrecy
of internal communications within the Executive Branch. Only
two Presidents, Andrew Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt, can
he apparently blocked a Senate move to obtain information from the head of the Bureau of Corporations, Herbert Knox Smith. Roosevelt reportedly described his actions
to an aide:
The Senate called for certain papers in the Bureau of Corporations this week
and on Thursday ordered Herbert Knox Smith to transmit all papers on a
certain subject in his office. He came to see me and to tell me that most of
the papers were given in a confidential way; that if they were made public
no end of trouble would ensue. I ordered Smith to get a decision from the
Attorney-General that these papers should not be made public, and yesterday the Committee on Judiciary of the Senate summoned Herbert Knox
Smith before it and informed him that if he did not at once transmit these
papers the Senate would order his imprisonment at once or the committee
would. As soon as he reported this to me I'ordered him in writing to turn
over to me all the papers in the case, so that I could assist the Senate in the
prosecution of its investigation.
I have those papers in my possession, and last night I informed Senator
Clark of the Judiciary Committee what I had done. I told him also that the
Senate should not have those papers and that Herbert Knox Smith had
turned them over to me. The only way the Senate or the committee can get
those papers now is through my impeachment, and I so informed Senator
Clark last night.
I will retain those papers until the 3d of March [the expiration of
Roosevelt's term of office] at least. Some of these facts which they want, for
what purposes I hardly know, were given to the Government under the seal
of secrecy and cannot be divulged, and I will see to it that the word of this
Government to the individual is kept sacred.
THE LETTERS OF ARCHIE BUTT, PERSONAL AIDE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 305-06 (L.
Abbot ed. 1924).
After his term had expired, Roosevelt was less reticent. He testified before a congressional committee and published defenses of his decision. See G. MowsY, THEODORE
ROOSEVELT AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 190-91 (1946); H. PRINGLE, THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, A BIOGRAPHY 441-45 (1931); THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
438-43, 560-73 (1920).
7' See note 51 supra.
74 E. EBERLING,

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 282 (1928);

WILLOUGHBY, supra

note 21, § 968, at 1488; Mason, CongressionalDemands Upon the Executive for Information,
5 PAPERS OF AM. HISTORICAL ASS'N 367, 374 (1891).
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be said to have withheld information under circumstances in
which the withholding could not easily be justified upon some
other, specialized ground.
(3) So far as one can judge from the history of past occasions for claiming power to withhold, President Nixon would
have not done the slightest damage to the Presidency by an immediate, full disclosure. President Jackson, surely a strong
Chief Executive, wrote that if the Congress could
point to any case where there is the slightest reason to
suspect corruption or abuse of trust, no obstacle which
I can remove shall be interposed to prevent the fullest
scrutiny by all legal means. The offices of all the departments will be opened to you,
and every proper
75
facility furnished for this purpose.
(4) There is no settled executive practice of giving Congress whatever it wishes from the Executive Branch.
2.

Judicial Privilege

In his dissenting opinion in Nixon v. Sirica Judge MacKinnon asserted that the 'judicial branch of our government claims
a similar privilege [not to respond to congressional subpoenas],
grounded on an assertion of independence from the other
branches.

' 76

There is no published record of any such asser-

tion. The materials cited by Judge MacKinnon are: (i) a newspaper report indicating that some Justices of the Supreme
Court are opposed to the imposition of ethical standards for
judges in place of individual discretion;7 7 (ii) general statements
about the need for secrecy that envelops judicial work7 8 and the
power to initiate security measures; 7 9 (iii) a letter from the Chief
Judge of a Court of Appeals declining to furnish to an individual United States Senator information confirming or denying
reports concerning the disqualification of certain judges while
a case was under advisement, upon the ground that reply
13 CONG. DEB., App. 202 (1837).
487 F.2d at 740. See also id. at 772-73 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
7 N.Y. Times, May 18, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
7
8 E.g., Brennan, Working at Justice, in AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT
300 (A. Westin ed. 1963); Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 313
(1955).
7' New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
75
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"would not be appropriate"; 80 (iv) a letter from Justice Tom C.
Clark declining to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee about events which occurred while he was
Attorney General because the "complete independence of the
81
judiciary is necessary to the proper administration of justice";
and (v) a statement signed by the judges of a federal district
court expressing unwillingness that "a Judge of this Court...
testify with respect to any Judicial proceedings" before a House
sub-committee investigating the Department of Justice. 82 The
first two items show only how far afield it was necessary to go in
order to find any "support" for the supposed privilege. The
third claim does not involve a legal privilege. The fourth, Justice Clark's letter, seems to go far beyond any legally sustainable
claim; surely no judicial privilege or immunity excuses a judge
from giving testimony about his prior, nonjudicial activities.
The statement of the District Judges probably did assert a formal privilege, but it gives no reliable indication of what evidence
83
the congressional committee desired.
Undoubtedly, some kind of privilege of confidentiality protects judicial deliberations, including communications between
judge and law clerk or secretary, but there has never been occasion in the federal courts to decide whether the supposed
privilege is grounded in the common law or the Constitution; 84
whether it is a qualified, or an absolute privilege; or who rules
upon whether the privilege is applicable when it is claimed. Canvassing these issues of judicial confidentiality adds perspective,
but so long as they go unanswered themselves the analogy gives
no reliable guide to the parallel issues of executive privilege.
In the absence of express constitutional command, settled
constitutional tradition, or binding precedent, one had to ask,
prior to United States v. Nixon, what rule of executive privilege
would work best. In the first case involving Watergate tapes,
counsel to President Nixon asserted: "Were it to be held ... that
80 The incident is described in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 742.
81N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1953, at 9, cols. 5-6.
82 Statement of the Judges of the District Court for the Northern District of California, 14 F.R.D. 335 (1953). In fact Judge Goodman did testify. Senate Hearing, supra
note 2, at 482-83.
83 A second statement accompanying the first suggests that the committee may
have been seeking to pierce the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. 14 F.R.D. at 336.
84 The closest analogy is the defeasible common law privilege that attached to the
deliberations of a trial jury. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
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there is any circumstance under which the President can be
compelled to produce recordings or notes of his private conversations, from that moment on it would be simply impossible for
any President of the United States to function. 85
The supporting argument followed the line sketched by
Professor Charles Black in a letter to the New York Times:
It is hard for me to see how any person of common
sense could think that those consultative and decisional
processes that are the essence of the Presidency could
be carried on to any good effect, if every participant
spoke or wrote in continual awareness that at any moment any Congressional committee, or any prosecutor
working with a grand jury, could at will command the
production of8 the
verbatim record of every word writ6
ten or spoken.

No one would deny the potentiality of injury if any word
spoken or written in the Executive Offices upon any occasion
should be available upon any demand by any prosecutor or any
congressional committee at any time without any further showing of need. But to demonstrate that the President should not
be under an absolute duty to provide any and all information
upon any and all occasions falls far short of making out the claim
of President Nixon's attorneys that the President must have an
absolute privilege upon any and all occasions to withhold whatever he wills. Both law and constitutional practice ought to be
capable of recognizing, and making a more delicate adjustment
in, the middle ground. At the threshhold, questions concerning
the relationship between the President and Congress should be
separated from questions concerning his duty to the courts.

IV.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE COURTS

Executive privilege may be claimed in several different
kinds of judicial proceedings, ranging from criminal prosecutions to actions brought under the Freedom of Information Act
solely to obtain access to executive files. The differences have
enough potential importance to warrant separate discussion of
the principal categories.
15 Brief in Opposition at 33, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon,
360 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1973).
86N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1973, at 31, cols. 1-2.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1383

A. Criminal Cases
The decision in United States v. Nixon 87 required President
Nixon to turn tape recordings of private conversations with his
aides over to a district court for examination in camera in order
that irrelevant portions may be excised and relevant portions be
admitted as evidence at the trial of some of the aides upon an
indictment charging conspiracy to obstruct justice. The unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burger puts four propositions beyond dispute:
(1) It is for the courts to determine the extent of the duty
of the President and other executive officials to produce evi88
dence, and conversely the extent of any executive privilege.
(2) The Executive has a constitutional privilege, albeit defeasible, to maintain the confidentiality of internal communications, based upon the public interest in securing personal privacy and encouraging open and candid discussion of executive
business.

89

(3) This generalized privilege of confidentiality must yield
where either the prosecution or defense has need for evidence
of internal communications which is otherwise admissible upon
trial of an indictment. "To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena
essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a
generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely impair
the role of the courts under Art. III."90
(4) Where there is a preliminary showing that the subpoenaed material is likely to contain conversations relevant to
the charge, the district judge should receive and examine it in
camera, separate the parts which are relevant and otherwise admissible, and return the rest under seal."1
There is nothing startling or even very novel in these propositions, apart from the personal involvement of President Nixon and the chance that the production of the evidence would
prove his complicity in the crime.
8794 S.Ct. 3090 (1974).
88

89 Id. at 3105-06.

Id.at 3106.
90 Id.at 3107.
91Id. at 3110.
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The first proposition merely applies to the production of
evidence the long-settled principle that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is."92 The courts have authoritatively defined the scope of
analogous privileges such as the immunity conferred upon Sen93
ators and Representatives by the Speech or Debate Clause.
The general principle seems applicable to the new instance.
Courts are accustomed to weighing the need for particular evidence in a specific judicial proceeding against the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of particular relationships and the governmental interest in secrecy. Earlier lower
federal courts 94 and courts in other countries adhering to the
English common law tradition 95 had rather consistently held
that the courts must rule on claims of executive or crown privilege. The precedents are not numerous. Except for Nixon v.
Sirica,96 they did not arise out of criminal cases. Nor did they involve conversations with the President himself, except for the
rulings on the first subpoena for Watergate tapes by Judge
Sirica and the Court of Appeals. Still, the underlying reasoning
is applicable. As stated by Professor Wigmore:
A court which abdicates its inherent function of determining the facts upon which the admissibility of evidence depends will furnish to bureaucratic officials too
ample opportunities for abusing the privilege. The
lawful limits of the privilege are extensible beyond any
control if its applicability is left to the determination of
the very official whose interest it
may be to shield a
7
wrongdoing under the privilege. 9
Even if by an extraordinary act of conscience and detachment a President could judge impartially the relative public
92 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See also text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
93 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
'4 See cases cited notes 111, 125-26, infra.
9- In Comay v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910, the House of Lords explicitly reversed
its long held view as expressed in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co. [1942] A.C. 624,
that executive privilege to determine if it is in the public interest that evidence be
withheld is absolute. See also Robinson v. South Australia (No. 2), [1931] A.C. 704 (P.C.S.
AustI.); Gagnon v. Quebec Sec. Comm'n, 50 D.L.R. 2d 329 (1964); Bruce v. Waldron,
[1963] Vict. 3; Corbett v. Social Security Comm'n [1962] N.Z.L.R. 878; Amar Chand
Butail v. Union of India, [1965] 1 India S. Ct. 243.
96 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
97 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2379, at 809-10 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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advantages of secrecy and disclosure without regard to the consequences for himself or his associates, confidence in the Presidency as well as in the integrity and impartiality of the legal
system as between the high and the lowly is nonetheless impaired by the violation of the ancient precept that no man shall
be judge of his own cause. For both reasons the courts must
make the final determination whether executive papers and
conversations are protected by an executive privilege in any
given criminal case.
Recognition of a defeasible or "presumptive" privilege of
confidentiality for executive communications is also sustained
by reason and authority. 9 8 Laying to one side the narrow categories of military and diplomatic secrets, 99 reports from confidential informants, 10 0 and investigative files,' 0 ' there are two
reasons for preserving the confidentiality of intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising parts of the process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated: (1) to encourage
aides and colleagues to give completely candid advice by reducing the risk that they will be subject to public disclosure, criticism and reprisals; (2) to give the President or other officer the
freedom "to think out loud," which enables him to test ideas
and debate policy and personalities uninhibited by the danger
that his tentative but rejected thoughts will become subjects of
public discussion.' 0 2 Usually, the information is sought with respect to past decisions; the need is even stronger if the demand
comes while policy is still being developed. These are bona fide
considerations, important enough to give rise to a right to confidentiality except as weightier public interests argue for disclosure. To these the Supreme Court added an interest in privacy
-a concern never thought to lessen the duty of an ordinary
03

citizen.1

The decisions in the lower federal courts had usually assumed that the interests secured by protecting the confidential-

"s
See cases cited notes 102,

111 & 125-26, infra.
" See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
100 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
101 See text accompanying notes 61-67 supra.
102International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349, 1358-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 827 (1971); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318,
324-26 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd mem. sub noma. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d
979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
103 94 S. Ct. at 3107.
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ity of executive communications might be outweighed by the
need for the evidence in a particular case, 10 4 but prior to Watergate the question never arose in a criminal case. The opinion of
the Supreme Court appears to hold that the public interest in
the production of all evidence needed for the fair trial of a criminal indictment outweighs the interests secured by confidentiality. 10 5 Regardless of whether the rule is as broad as stated or is
to be confined to facts like the Watergate coverup, the inherent
probabilities confine the inroads upon executive confidentiality
so narrowly as to minimize possible injury to the Presidency.
Executive communications are likely to be required upon
trial of an information or indictment only in three rather limited situations: (i) where the crime was mishandling the communication; (ii) where a government official whose conduct has
led to criminal charges seeks to prove justification or lack of criminal intent by introducing into evidence the instructions of
higher authority (as might have occurred in the prosecution of
John Ehrlichman and others for conspiring to steal the psychoanalytic files of Daniel Ellsberg); and (iii) where the communication itself contains evidence tending to prove or disprove crime
in the conduct of his office by an official who was privy to its
10 6
preparation or receipt (as in the Watergate coverup case).
In the first two situations the question of privilege will
rarely come to issue, for even if the communication were privileged, the Executive would have to choose between dropping
10 7
the prosecution and disclosure.
In the third situation, where the charge is one of wrongdoing in the Executive Branch, a President can often maintain
control of the prosecution through the Attorney General, but
there are legal as well as political limits to his power. A grand
jury "may persist in pressing the investigation into alleged executive wrongdoing despite the opposition of the U.S. Attorney, 0 8
even though an indictment would be invalid unless he signed
04

1 See cases cited notes 111, 125-126, infra.
105 94 S. Ct. at 3102-03, 3110.
106 If the official is not privy, the communication

would ordinarily be inadmissible hearsay.
Presumably, discussions involving matters unrelated to the conduct of office, such
as purely electoral politics, are not protected by even defeasible privilege. In practice, counsel
to President Nixon conceded this point on several occasions.
07
1 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671-72 (1957), and cases cited therein.
101In re Miller, 17 F. Cas. 295 (No. 9,552) (C.C.D. Ind. 1878), illustrates the principle. There the President instructed the United States Attorney not to investigate an
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it.1" ' Or the President, afraid of the political reaction if he requires the Attorney General or the latter's delegate to cease the
pursuit of the evidence, may stand instead upon a claim of constitutional or evidentiary privilege (as President Nixon sought
to do in all but one instance). 110
Where the prosecution involves crime in the conduct of
high government office (as it usually will if the presumptive
privilege can be invoked), the public has more than usual interest in the full and fair investigation of the issue. Public confidence in the integrity of the very processes of government
can be secured only by proof that there is capability to discover
and punish wrongdoing even at the highest levels in the Executive Branch. Confidence in the evenhanded administration of
criminal justice requires proof that the law is enforced against
the highest officials in the same manner as against the lowliest citizen.
alleged embezzlement. The grand jury asked the court for instructions. The court
replied:
If you believe the president's instructions to the district attorney were intended to prevent you from making the fullest investigation into the matter
now before you, and from returning an indictment against the accused if
the evidence should warrant it, you should be inspired with additional determination to do your duty. The moment the executive is allowed to control the action of the courts in the administration of criminal justice their independence is gone.
See also In re Grand Jury 1969 Term, 315 F. Supp. 662, 675-79 (D. Md. 1970); United
States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 291-92, 294-96 (N.D. Cal. 1952). Nor may government counsel "dictate to the grand jury." United States v. United States District Court,
238 F.2d 713, 720 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981 (1957). As an officer of
the court, United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. at 291-92, the attorney for the government may be required to prepare an indictment for the grand jury. In United States
v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), Judge Wisdom, although recognizing that "[t]he prosecution of offenses against the United States is an
executive function within the exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General," nevertheless stressed the grand jury's "plenary power to inquire, to summon and interrogate witnesses, and to present either findings and a report or an accusation in open
court by presentment." Id. 189-90 (concurring opinion). See also Gaither v. United
States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1065 n.1, 1069 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
10" See, e.g.,
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965); In re Grand Jury 1969 Term, 315 F. Supp. 662, 674 (D. Md. 1970); cf.
Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841
(1967); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
906 (1966) (both recognizing the absolute discretion of the Attorney General in choosing whether to initiate or abandon a prosecution).
110 United States v. Nixon holds that where the Attorney General has the statutory
responsibility for the conduct of litigation and he has delegated full responsibility to
a Special Prosecutor in a particular area by an unrevoked departmental regulation, the
Special Prosecutor exercises the sovereign power of the United States. 94 S. Ct. at
3100, 3102.
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The holding that the privilege based upon the interest in
encouraging candid executive discussion must yield under the
foregoing circumstances is unlikely to affect appreciably the
spontaneity or candor of formal or informal communications
with the President or elsewhere in the Executive Branch. Surely honest executive aides and officials can have confidence that
there will be only very rare occasions, if any, on which their
conversations or written communications will be both relevant
and otherwise admissible in a criminal trial. If this judgment
is too optimistic, as counsel to President Nixon argued on the
first subpoena, then the need is not for more privilege with
which the better to hide wrongdoing but for a rule enabling
the people the better to cleanse the Executive Branch.
Precedential support for this aspect of United States v. Nixon
can be found in two lower court decisions"' 1 and in an analogous ruling upon the privilege that shrouds the deliberations of
a jury. What is said in the jury room is normally excluded from
evidence in order to encourage frankness in discussion. In
Clark v. United States11 2 the Supreme Court held that upon the
"showing of a prima facie case" that the deliberations of a parI In Rosee v. Board of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1965), an action for conspiracy wrongfully to deprive the plaintiff of Board of Trade membership, the court
held the normal executive privilege inapplicable to communications from government
employees to their superiors where there was evidence of their participation in wrongdoing. In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1960) the issue was whether the Department of Justice had used a grand jury for the purpose of
obtaining evidence for a civil action. Procter & Gamble sought to obtain internal communications of the Department of Justice with which to prove abuse of the grand jury.
The United States claimed executive privilege. The court recognized that the papers
would normally be privileged but held that the privilege was inapplicable by analogy
to Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933):
So here, if there has been a subversion by the use of Grand Jury procedure
for civil purposes only, as condemned by our highest Court, not only the decision to do so, but also evidence material to that decision, are not the subject of the privilege, but are subject to disclosure. It also follows that evidence
material to showing that no such violation of law occurred is also material
to counteract possible proof to the contrary. To the above extent, the normal executive privilege of the Government to keep secret its full, free advices
and discussion with its agents and attorneys is delimited, where the "circumstances are appropriate".... It is therefore only evidence pro and con that
particular decision and intent that is admissible. But if such evidence exists,
it and it alone should be produced, despite the fact that it may be intermingled in a communication which otherwise might fall within the normal executive privilege as to discussions and deliberations of governmental agents
and attorneys. The evidence in that regard must therefore be produced.
25 F.R.D. at 490-91.
112 289 U.S. 1 (1933).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1383

ticular jury were tainted by crime, the interest in confidentiality
is outweighed by "the overmastering need, so vital in our polity,
of preserving trial by jury in its purity against the inroads of
corruption." 11 3 In that event the privilege evaporates, the Court
ruled, and "the debates and ballots in the jury room" become
14
admissible evidence.'
The opinion in United States v. Nixon deals only with claims
of a privilege based upon an unfocused executive need to preserve the confidentiality of communications also required in the
trial of a criminal indictment. Cases may arise in which this defeasible privilege would yield but in which the Executive can
invoke the higher claim that disclosure would endanger "military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets."' 1 5 The
law of evidence has long recognized some such privilege although there have been few occasions for invoking it. Probably,
the Court conceived this privilege quite narrowly. The language
at this and other points in the opinion is likely to cause grave
concern in some quarters, however, because of the breadth of
the national security claims made by President Nixon to cloak
highly questionable executive conduct.
The opinion is also imprecise with respect to the showing
which the party seeking the evidence must make before production will be required. Sometimes the Chief Justice spoke of "the
admissibility and relevance." ' 1 6 At other points he used different phrases such as "essential to the enforcement of criminal
statutes,"' " 7 "demonstrably relevant," 1 8 "needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense,""' and "some bearing on the
pending criminal cases.' 20 Judges feel the same stylistic distaste
as other authors for continual repetition of the same phrase.
The critical test is probably relevance and admissibility under
the rules of evidence, quite apart from the claim of defeasible
privilege. The alternative phrases should be read as efforts to
avoid excessive repetition having the same meaning as the critical terms.
This interpretation may seem at first blush to indicate that
"

3

Id. at 14, 16.

4

1 Id. at 14.
11594 S. Ct. at 3107, 3108-09.
116Id. at 3110.

Id. at
17
8
Id. at
"gId.
at
0
12 Id. at
"

3107.
3110.
3108.
3110.
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despite the talk about a defeasible privilege the duty to produce
evidence of confidential communications between a President
and his aides actually depends upon the same rules of competency, relevancy and materiality that govern the testimony of
any private person when proper objection is made. Two important additional requirements are implicit in the case, however.
First, the case involved serious criminal charges against
high government officials. The public interest in having all
competent, relevant and material evidence available in such a
case is higher than in any other kind.
Second, because the subpoena sought evidence for use
upon trial of an indictment, there was already an implicit determination, based upon evidence aliunde, of probable cause to believe that the officials named as defendants had committed serious crimes. In the initial litigation over the grand jury subpoena
for Watergate tapes, counsel to President Nixon argued that it
would be intolerable to have a rule allowing any federal prosecutor or any grand jury in any of the many hundred state or
federal courts to defeat executive privilege merely by showing
that the grand jury was investigating allegations of official criminality. The Special Prosecutor, believing that previously published testimony satisfied the kind of showing required in Clark
v. United States,12 1 preferred not to join issue upon this point. Instead, he conceded that the privilege could be defeated only if
other evidence already made a prima facie showing (or if it gave
"probable cause to believe") that such crimes had been committed; and he argued that the published evidence met that requirement. The indictment of President Nixon's aides provided
the equivalent of a prima facie showing in the Supreme Court
case, and it seems likely that where a subpoena is issued in aid of
grand jury proceedings the defeasible privilege will be a bar to
an order of production unless the evidence sought is relevant to
the guilt or innocence of persons under investigation for what
other evidence shows prima facie to be a criminal offence. 122
In the earlier litigation counsel to President Nixon also argued that even if all the major issues went against him, the subpoena should not be enforced because there was and could be
289 U.S. 1 (1933). See text accompanying notes 112-14, supra.
decision in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973), only partially
supports the text, for although a grand jury subpoena was at issue, the court relied
upon a "uniquely powerful", id. at 717, showing of need, including declarations and
conduct held to constitute a partial waiver of the privilege.
121

122 The
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no showing that the President was a. party to a crime. 12 3 The
Special Prosecutor, at that time, replied that no showing of the
President's personal complicity was required. This argument
was available in the Supreme Court case, but by that time the
grand jury's naming of President Nixon as a co-conspirator arguably established the equivalent of a prima facie showing of his
personal criminality unless the finding were set aside. The dismissal of the cross-petition for certiorari seeking to invalidate
this finding 12 4 and the reasoning of the Court in the principal
case both indicate that the Court held, as a matter of law, that
no showing of the complicity of the person claiming executive
privilege is required.
B. Civil Actions
Most of the reported federal decisions ruling upon claims
of executive privilege arose out of civil suits either against the
United States 125 or between private parties.1 26 All recognize a
qualified privilege applicable to internal recommendations,
opinion and advice as distinguished from facts; this privilege is
probably based upon the law of evidence rather than the Constitution. All the cases that face the question treat the privilege
as incomplete. All of the cases hold or assume that the court
should decide in each particular case whether the need for the
evidence in the administration of justice outweighs the value of
confidentiality as an encouragement to candor.1 27 Generally
speaking, the decisions distinguish between statements of fact,
which are held not to be privileged, and advice, opinions and
12' Brief of Petitioner at 70-7 1, Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
124 94 S. Ct. at 3097 n.2.
125E.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788

(D.C. Cir. 1971); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1961); Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
126E.g., Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Machin v. Zuckert, 316
F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd mem. sub noma.V.E.B. Carl Zeiss,
Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 99 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); Clark v. Pearson, 238 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1965).
127E.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788,
794 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318
(D.D.C. 1966), aff'd mem. sub. nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United
States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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recommendations, the production of which has not been required. t 28 There appear to be no decided civil cases, other than
suits to review agency action, in which production of evidence
containing opinion or recommendations was required. Investi29
gative files are normally held privileged.
United States v. Nixon may encourage some litigants to seek
broader disclosure, but the current of judicial opinion in civil
cases seems unlikely to change. The case for disclosure in the
investigation and prosecution of crimes by high government
officials is much stronger than a civil litigant can make.
C.

Review of Agency Decisions

When a private litigant seeks to review the action of an administrative agency, the usual privilege pertaining to internal
communications once was fortified by the rule announced in
the fourth Morgan case, which seemed to bar probing the mental processes of the decisionmaker. 130 Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe 13 ' qualifies that earlier rule:
[W]here there are administrative findings that were
made at the same time as the decision, . . . there must
be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behaviour
before such inquiry may be made. But here there are
no such formal findings and it may be that the only
is by examinway there can be effective judicial review
1 32
ing the decisionmakers themselves.
In either event internal agency communications would be
the best evidence unless access can be barred by executive privilege. In the unreported case of Nader v. Butz the district judge
ordered President Nixon to turn over for in camera inspection
certain records pertaining to an order raising milk prices but
the litigation on this issue appears to have ended without appel128 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-89 (1973), in addition to the cases cited at
notes 125-27, supra.
12' Clark v. Pearson, 238 F. Supp. 495, 495-96 (D.D.C. 1965); 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2378, at 792 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
,30 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941); accord, International Paper Co.
v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1971); North Am. Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
240 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Walled Lake Door Co. v. United States, 31 F.R.D. 258
(E.D. Mich. 1962).
131 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
132Id. at 420.
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late review. 13 3 The issue has not been decided elsewhere since
the Overton Park case.
D. Freedom of InformationAct
The Freedom of Information Act' 34 requires federal agencies to make a broad spectrum of information available to the
public but exempts certain categories. Exemption 5 covers:
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in . . . litigation with the agency." 135 In Environmental Protection
Agency v. Mink136 the Supreme Court held that, except in the
case of classified material, the duty of discovery extends in civil
litigation and therefore under the Act to "purely factual material appearing . . . in a form that is severable without com' 1 37
promising the private remainder of the documents."
United States v. Nixon is unlikely to affect the interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act. Should the Act be
amended to enlarge the right of citizens to information about
the internal conduct of governmental affairs, the broader duty
of disclosure might be said to conflict with a constitutional privilege of executive confidentiality. United States v. Nixon would
lend considerable support to the argument; the Chief Justice
declared that even the generalized but defeasible privilege of
confidentiality, "is fundamental to the operation of government
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution,"'1 3 8 and later he observed, "to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it
1 39
is constitutionally based.
These expressions are the first judicial support for the view
that an executive privilege to withhold information is inferable
from the Constitution.1 40 The future may accept them or discard them as assumptions wholly unnecessary to the decision of

"'Civil No. 148-72 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1973). The order is referred to in Nader v.
Butz, 60 F.R.D. 381 (D.D.C. 1973) (staying the order pending appellate review), and
in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 796 n.176 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
1345 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
13 5 Id. § 552(b)(5).
136 410 U.S. 73 (1973).

137Id. at 91.
13894 S. Ct. 3090, 3107 (1974).
139 Id. at 3109.
140In United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), the Court did not reach the

question whether executive privilege derives from the Constitution. Id. at 6.
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the case. Quite possibly the second passage holds the key: communications to and from the President may be constitutionally
protected to the extent determined by the Judicial Branch, but
since Congress creates the executive departments and agencies
legislative and
it may be empowered to legislate concerning
41
public access to their internal affairs.1
V.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE CONGRESS

Congress may seek access to internal executive papers and
conversations in two very different contexts, both dramatically
illustrated by the Watergate affair: (A) in legislative hearings
seeking the information necessary to the intelligent formulation
and enactments of legislation, and (B) in proceedings looking
towards impeachment of the President by the House of Representatives and trial by the Senate. The pre-Eisenhower history
of executive refusals in legislative proceedings is summarized
above.1 42 In impeachment proceedings the claim of executive
privilege was first inter'posed whqn President Nixon refused to
comply with a subpoena issued by the House Committee on the
143
Judiciary.
A. Legislative Hearings
When a congressional body seeks information from the
Executive Branch to assist in its legislative function and the
President refuses, its claimed "right" to the evidence and a presidential "privilege" to withhold are both of an altogether different character than the right and privilege at issue in judicial
proceedings. In a judicial proceeding the court rules upon legal
obligations which can be embodied in a formal judgment binding on those concerned and normally carrying punitive sanctions. Upon such questions our political and legal traditions give
the courts, ultimately the Supreme Court, the final word even
to the point of governing both President and Congress. Until
very recently no one ever supposed that the issue raised by a
congressional demand and presidential refusal raised questions
susceptible of adjudication. 1 4 4 The debate was often cast in conMeyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240-94 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying notes 54-75 supra.
143Possibly, a third context should be identified: congressional oversight of the
conduct of executive departments. Such oversight, however, is usually a step towards
legislation.
144 See authorities cited in notes 153-54 infra.
141 Cf
142
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stitutional terms, but the appeal was to political theory, history,
and common sense. The distance the contest was pushed depended upon political considerations. The sanctions available
to the House or Senate (as the case might be) were wholly political. Their use depended upon public reaction and political
power.1 45 The controversies have been rather infrequent, and
one can discern little tendency to develop anything that could
be called settled practice carrying a degree of legitimacy even
1 46
though without legal sanction.
Recent trends in government-the growth of the size and
power of the executive establishment and the broadening and
increasing frequency of claims of executive privilege in relation
to legislative hearings-have raised questions concerning the
need for new safeguards of the "right" of Congress to inform it1 47
self and the people upon issues appropriate for legislation.
The problem is exemplified by the efforts of the House Judiciary Committee and Senate Select Committee to obtain Watergate tapes. President Nixon refused tO comply with the subpoena of the House Judiciary Committee and paid heavy
political costs but the Committee had no effective response
145 When President Theodore Roosevelt refused to surrender papers relevant to
the decision not to prosecute United States Steel Corporation under the Sherman Act
for the acquisition of Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company, Senator Bacon, one
of his critics, offered a general resolution asserting the right of Congress to "any and
every public document, paper, or record . . . on the files of any department of the
Government, relating to any subject whatever over which Congress has any grant of
power . . . under the Constitution ..
" 43 CONG. REC. 839 (1909). In support of his
resolution, Senator Bacon, relying heavily 8on previous congressional debates on executive privilege, emphasized the Senate's need to be able to obtain information from
the Executive so that it could "perform its legitimate constitutional functions," and
warned that an autocracy would result if the Senate's demands were not recognized.
Id. 840. President Roosevelt's supporters objected that the resolution could settle
nothing:
Mr. FULTON. Assuming that either House of Congress has the right, or that
the Senate has the right, to demand this information . . . is that a right that
can be enforced otherwise than by congressional legislation?

Mr. BACON. The question of enforcement is a matter of some difficulty. I
will say to the Senator that Senator Logan, in the debate I have been quoting, discussed that very question. He seemed to concede the fact that there
was no present or immediate remedy in case the head of a department or
the President should refuse.
Mr. FULTON. Exactly.
Mr. BACON. But he seemed to think that the disclosure to the public of their
refusal would have its proper rebuke and remedy at the hands of the people.
Id. 849.
146See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
147See text following note 152 infra.
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other than to recommend citing the refusal as ground for impeachment. The obstacles along the road to judicial enforcement were probably insuperable; at best the effort to overcome
them would have entailed months or even years of litigation.
Even though the Senate Select Committee was unusually
strong in terms of the influence of its senior members in the
Senate and its public support, it was powerless to overcome
President Nixon's claim of executive privilege by political methods, and therefore chose the unprecedented step of taking the
problem to the courts. The suit foundered upon jurisdictional
shoals when Judge Sirica ruled that none of the existing statutes
authorized a federal court to entertain a Senate committee's action to enforce its subpoena. 48 Congress launched a new vessel
by vesting jurisdiction in the District Court for the District of
Columbia.1 49 This ship too ran aground when District Judge
Gesell ruled that enforcement would raise such undue risk of
pretrial publicity in the pending Watergate criminal prosecutions as to warrant dismissal without ruling upon the underlying
question.1 50 The court of appeals affirmed upon the ground
that the Senate Select Committee had failed to show that the
information was "demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions.'

5

' The Committee ex-

pired without pressing the matter further.
Although the jurisdictional act relied upon by the Senate
Select Committee applied only to its own subpoenas, another
bill attempts resolution of the ancient political problem by referring it to the courts. The bill provides:
The District Court for the District of Columbia
shall have original, exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action brought by either House of Congress, a joint
committee of Congress, or any committee of either
House of Congress with respect to any claim of executive privilege asserted before either such House or any
such joint committee or committee. 5
The proposal raises two related questions: (1) Is the proposal constitutional? (2) Would its enactment be wise?
'48
'49

Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973).
Pub. L. No. 93-190 (Dec. 18, 1973), 87 Stat. 736 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C.

§1364).
,50 Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1974).
5'Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1-2 S.2073, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1364 (1973).
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1. Constitutionality of Vesting the Courts With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Legislative Subpoenas Resisted Upon Grounds of
Executive Privilege
The principal constitutional question is whether executive
resistance to a legislative subpoena gives rise to the kind of "case
or controversy" that the federal courts are authorized by article
III to adjudicate. As late as 1958 Judge Learned Hand gave this
as one of the clearest examples of a nonjusticiable constitutional
question. 153 Recent critics of executive privilege argue that de154
cisions during the 1960's point to the opposite conclusion.
Even Judge Learned Hand argues that the Supreme Court
properly exercises a major responsibility for the structure of
our extraordinarily complex system of government.155 The
Court has often rendered decisions allocating power between
the legislative and executive branches, sometimes where there
was controversy between them. The "sick chicken" and "hot oil"
cases of the New Deal era posed questions concerning the
15 6
power the Legislative Branch can delegate to the Executive.
The Steel Seizure case tested the President's power to operate
private steel mills during a labor dispute without the aid of legislation.1 57 Meyers v. United States15 8 and Humphrey's Executor v.
United States' 59 grew out of direct congressional efforts to limit
the President's power to remove officers or employees in the
Executive Branch. In United States v. Lovett160 the situation was
converse: the Executive challenged the power of Congress to
force the dismissal of executive employees. Earlier, in United
States v. Klein16 ' Congress had vainly attempted to deny effect
to a presidential pardon. Recent cases in the lower courts rule
upon the legality of the President's impoundment of funds ap62
propriated by Congress.
153 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 17-18 (1964).

.4 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 2, at 304-41; Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 2, at
33-40.
155 L. HAND, supra note 153, at 10-15.

,-6 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.- United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
'57 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
158 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
I'

295 U.S. 602 (1935).

160 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
161 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
162 See, e.g., Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973)
and authorities cited therein; State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th
Cir. 1973); People ex rel. Bakalis v. Weinburger, 368 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1973).

1974]

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Each of the foregoing cases was brought by or against a
state or a private person who had a material stake in the outcome. The named parties in an action to enforce a subpoena
against a claim of executive privilege might be the Congress or
a congressional body and the President.
The difference in named parties is probably irrelevant. In
United States v. Nixon the Court held that "the fact that both parties are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as
a barrier to justiciability." 163 Other cases have been adjudicated in which the named, opposing parties were government
1 64
agencies.
The absence of a material private stake in the outcome may
prove more important. In all the interagency cases someone
stood to gain or lose some substantial, material interest as a result of challenged agency action. The agencies were both petitioner and respondent in the Supreme Court only because a
proceeding against the agency which was the initial tribunal was
the prescribed form of judicial review. "[C]ourts must look behind names that symbolize the parties to determine whether a
justiciable case or controversy is presented."16 5 Two sentences
in United States v. Nixon, when read in isolation, strongly support the view that a private material interest is not required for
a constitutional "case or controversy":
[The evidence] is sought by one official of the Government within the scope of his express authority; it is resisted by the chief executive on the ground of his duty
to preserve the confidentiality of the communications
of the President. Whatever the correct answer on the
merits, these issues are "of a type which are traditionally justiciable." United States v. ICC, 337 U.S., at 430.166
But the Chief Justice probably meant to limit these sentences
by the preceding sentence which points out that the evidence
whose production is sought and resisted is "deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case" 1 6 -an element that satisfied the need for the "kind of
16394 S. Ct. at 3102.
'64See, e.g., Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954); United

States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953); ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503
(1944).
105 United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949).
11694 S.Ct. at 3102.
67

1 Id. (emphasis added).
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controversy courts traditionally resolve." 168
Another quite different line of argument logically goes far
to sustain the view that the interest of Congress in obtaining information with which to carry on the processes of government
is sufficient to answer the claim that there is no case or controversy because a judicially cognizable interest is not at issue. The
Court has sustained the constitutionality of a statute punishing
as criminal contempt any refusal to appear in response to a congressional subpoena and any refusal upon appearance "to an169
swer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry."
A prosecution under this statute gives rise to a case or controversy. There would seem to be a case or controversy, therefore,
if the statute were amended to authorize the dis.trict court to entertain an action by the United States as sovereign to enforce
the statutory obligation to provide evidence. Such "cases" are
common enough under regulatory laws. 170 There is also a case
or controversy when an administrative agency seeks judicial assistance to enforce an administrative subpoena. 17 If the analogies are compelling up to this point, surely either house of
Congress would be a constitutionally appropriate body to act
for the sovereign in the specific enforcement of a law designed
72
solely to assist it in deliberating upon proposed legislation.
A more difficult question is whether the issue raised by an
assertion of executive privilege to withhold specific internal
communications from Congress is nonjusticiable because there
are no judicially manageable standards by which the controversy can be adjudicated. 7 3 If the question arose in an action to
enforce a congressional subpoena, there would be no inconvenience in dismissing the complaint upon this ground and
remitting the Executive and Legislature to their political battle.
168 Id.
169

In re Chapman 166 U.S. 661 (1897).

170 Examples are collected in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1309-26 (2d ed. 1973).

17'ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
172 Other commentators have argued that under Baker v. Carr, 368 U.S. 186
(1962), the political interest of a congressional committee is sufficient to give standing and supply whatever is necessary in the nature of a legally cognizable interest.
E.g., Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 2, at 36. But the Supreme Court seems reluctant
to extend legal protection to political interests. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 94 S. Ct. 2925 (1974).
173On the importance of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, see
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 222
(1962).
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Suppose, however, that the President instructs a subordinate to
withhold internal communications upon the ground of executive privilege, that the Senate or House finds the subordinate in
contempt and that the Sergeant-at-Arms arrests him. Habeas
corpus is available to test the legality of the confinement.1 7 4 In
such a proceeding the court will normally entertain claims of
constitutional privilege, such as the fifth amendment's guaranty
against compelled self-incrimination. 175 If a plausible claim of
the constitutionally based claim of executive privilege is presented and the court cannot adjudicate it, is the executive subordinate to be discharged from custody or the petition to be dismissed and the confinement continue? Usually the involvement
of a nonjusticiable, political question in a larger justiciable controversy does not foreclose all judicial action; the court accepts
as the foundation for its action the decision of the political
branch. 176 In the supposed case, however, the court would be
confronted by the opposing determinations of two branches,
each of which is entitled to deference. The court would be under the strongest pressure to resolve the conflict unless it was
prepared to discharge the prisoner upon the ground that the
political question doctrine made it impossible for the Sergeant1 77
at-Arms to show legal ground for the deprivation of liberty.
If the Attorney General allowed the proceeding to go forward,
a similar difficulty would be presented by a prosecution for contempt of Congress, albeit eased by the fact that the government,
as the moving party, would have the burden of making its case.
Apart from these difficulties there is much to be said for
judicial refusal to adjudicate claims of executive privilege vis-avis the Legislative Branch. Determining the strictly legal obliga1 78
tions of executive officials is a familiar judicial responsibility.
Defining the rights and privileges of the Congress and President inter sese in the legislative process has never been a judicial
function. Courts are accustomed to weighing the need for specific pieces of evidence in a judicial proceeding against the
174

Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.
135 (1927); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880)..
1'75See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).
176 E.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations, 40 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 199, 205-06 (1971).
177 On factual questions, which provide the only analogy, the petitioner has the
burden of persuasion. Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946);
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
178 See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
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public interest in preserving the confidentiality of particular
relationships, but they have no experience in weighing the legislative needs of Congress against other public interests. The
need for access to executive papers and communications arises
too seldom in traditional forms of civil or criminal proceeding
for the judicial rulings to have much impact upon the effectiveness of the Presidency, but the occasions upon which Congress
may demand information are virtually unlimited. Any binding
definition of the power of the Senate or House of Representatives to obtain the internal communications of the Executive
Branch and of the President to withhold them might greatly affect the relative political power and effectiveness of the Executive and Legislative Branches. President Nixon would have
raised a point deserving of serious consideration if his assertion
that attacks on executive privilege weaken the Presidency had
been confined to congressional subpoenas in aid of legislation.
Raoul Berger, a close student of executive privilege, suggests that "in almost every category of claimed executive privilege to withhold information there exist judicial precedents
formulated in private litigation."1 7 9 I find marked differences
between the questions raised by a claim of executive privilege
during a judicial proceeding and those presented by an executive refusal of a congressional demand. The differences raise
some doubt about the ability of judges to develop workable criteria for adjudicating the controversies between the Legislative
and Executive Branches. They raise even more doubt about the
wisdom of the effort.
Consider first the case of true military and diplomatic secrets. In the open courtroom the Executive's claim of privilege
is uniformly sustained.18 0 Should it be sustained against a congressional committee? The key question is the sufficiency of the
security measures Congress is willing to adopt. Can a judge inquire into this? Must he assume their sufficiency? Is he to decide just how damaging a leak would be? Or is the whole matter
better left to solution by negotiation as the occasions arise-a
process in which judgments can be made concerning the trustworthiness of individuals?
Consider next the problem of investigative files. A judicial
proceeding is usually adversary. The plaintiff and defendant
1 Berger, supra note 2, at 1355.
180 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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may be expected to call for observance of rather strict rules of
evidence which would exclude most of the contents of such files
as hearsay or otherwise incompetent long before reaching any
question of privilege. 18 1 In legislative hearings the committees
quite properly refuse to confine themselves to evidence competent in a court. There are no parties. The Executive must therefore take it upon itself to protect individuals against disclosure
of untested allegations and reports. It is all too clear that fairness requires some protection for the individual; it is also beyond argument that the interests of efficient administration are
thereby served. Men and women will be less willing to take positions in the government if they know that they thereby open
themselves to publication of rumors and false allegations. Informants will be less likely to come forward with information.
The government may shrink from conducting a thorough investigation knowing the risk of abuse of what it gathers. Few individuals whose files were publicized in congressional hearings
conducted by a publicity-seeking Senator or Representative
would think themselves protected by the rights to cross-examine
and offer opposing testimony. 1 82 For such reasons few of the
present critics of executive privilege found fault with Presidents
Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower for withholding intelligence or loyalty and security files.
On the other hand, a blanket rule of privilege would seem
to carry excessive costs. Should antitrust files in cases closed by
consent decree be withheld from the Sqnate Judiciary Committee while considering proposed legislation, or the nomination to
higher office of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Anti-Trust Division? Should a legislative committee investigating the need for further legislation against electronic eavesdropping be denied access to the files containing information
about the "bugging" of John Sears, William Safire and Morton
Halperin?
The problem of investigative files, like the problem of state
secrets, lends itself better to solutions negotiated through the
political process than to an "either-or" judicial determination.
At the hearings on the nomination of Henry Kissinger to be
Secretary of State complete disclosure of the initiation, conduct,
and results of the "bugging" done in an effort to trace the
181 See note 129 supra & accompanying text.
contrary view is expressed by Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 2, at 28-29.

182 A
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source of leaks might have been as inappropriate as complete
withholding. In .the absence of a judicial rule an informal arrangement was worked out giving a few members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee access to the information, and
they made a report.
In many civil cases the rule covering claims of executive
privilege has come to be that statements of fact must be disclosed but documents containing opinion, advice or other discussions of policy may be withheld in order to protect the Executive's substantial interest in the freedom of subordinates to
give candid advice, and of superior officials to try out ideas on
subordinates, without risk of being held up to political reprisals
or public scorn. The distinction seems hardly appropriate to
legislative hearings. Matters of opinion are rarely germane to
civil litigation, nor are the roles played by individual government officials. Congress, on the other hand, is often seeking experienced opinion, and studies of the functioning of executive
departments and of the need for remedial legislation often require precise information concerning the allocation of responsibility and the background of decisions.
The point is illustrated by a pending Senate bill to make the
Attorney General and Department of Justice independent of
the President. 183 Any Senate subcommittee conducting hearings
upon such a bill would be assisted by detailed information about
the relationship of the executive offices to departmental decisions upon seeking indictments, instituting civil actions, seeking
certiorari, entering into settlements, etc. Should a claim of executive privilege be allowed? I would suppose not, provided that
the subcommittee's inquiry were serious, even though expressions of opinions and recommendations were sought and there
was neither charge nor showing of criminal wrongdoing. But
consider what splendid political ammunition such hearings
might provide and how titillating might be the disclosures. Suppose that the motive of the chairman of the subcommittee was
to make political capital in an election year. Should confidentiality be breached in the latter instance? Intuition tells me "no,"
even though I perceive no seemly rule of law by which a court
could distinguish a bona fide investigation.
The basic principle applicable to claims of executive privilege in a civil action is that internal communications are pre183 S. 2803, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).

19741

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

sumptively privileged but the generalized interest in confidentiality must yield to a showing of particularized need for the
evidence.184 The need to protect aides and subordinates from
reprisals on Capitol Hill and in the media of public debate is a
thousand-fold greater in the case of congressional hearings,
which are often the preserves of individual Senators and Congressmen not all of whom are invariably characterized by judicious self-restraint. Weighing the need for particular evidence
at a trial over which he is presiding is not difficult for a judge,
but it would seem both embarrassing and difficult for a court to
weigh the need of a congressional committee to see papers
against the Executive's need for confidentiality. Is the judge to
be limited to asking whether there is some logical connection
between the papers and records and some conceivable new law?
Normally, a court must presume the existence of a proper basis
for congressional action,1 8 5 but that principle may not be applicable in the face of an inconsistent presidential determination.
Is the judge to scrutinize what information the committee
already has or should be able to obtain from other sources?
Should he decide whether the legislative need is real or only
professed by Senators or Representatives seeking political advantage in badgering second or third level executive officials?
How far is he to appraise such factors as the need for legislation
or the likelihood of enactment?

186

The difficulty of finding and articulating rules of decision
is concretely illustrated by two claims of executive privilege during the Eisenhower years. One involved Senator Joseph McCarthy's inquiry into the Army's loyalty and security program;
the other was concerned with the Dixon-Yates contract for the
sale of electric power to the Atomic Energy Commission-an
inquiry involving conflicts of interest and White House pressure upon supposedly independent agencies. Both instances involved the internal operations of the Executive Branch. Both
inquiries could have been conducted as serious studies of pressing issues. History will record that President Eisenhower's first
refusal was morally and politically justified and that the second
was wrong, but I can formulate no rule of law not turning upon
See note 127 supra & accompanying text.
185 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
16 Cf Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where
the court evaluated the committee's need for the evidence and held it insufficient to
justify the invasion of confidentiality while the evidence was being sought by others.
184
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judgments of motive and political desirability for distinguishing between them.
The purely investigative functions of Congress add an even
more puzzling dimension to analysis of the proper treatment of
claims of executive confidentiality. In holding that there is "no
congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure," the
Supreme Court observed, "The public is, of course, entitled to
18 7
be informed concerning the workings of its government,"
and therefore distinguished "the power of Congress to inquire
into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency
in the agencies of the Government."18 8 How is a court to decide
the issue when this congressional power of oversight collides
with the interest in encouraging freedom and candor of deliberation in the Executive Branch? In a criminal investigation or
prosecution a court will order production on the ground that
the evidence is necessary to a fair determination of official
wrongdoing if an indictment or other evidence gives cause to
believe that a crime has occurred. 8 9" Must Congress make such a
showing to a court? Coming at the principle from the other side,
should confidentiality prevail unless the inquiry promises evidence of crime? Should not breach of fiduciary duty, undue
White House pressure, incompetence, or mismanagement be
sufficient? If so, no privilege of substance is left to secure candor
and room for wide-ranging thought in executive deliberations.
Any lawyer with a modicum of imagination can raise hardto-answer questions whenever it is suggested that a court move
into new ground. Usually courts do develop criteria. A judicial
robe renders a man no less capable of making up his mind than
an executive or legislator. The real concern is that in the absence of more or less objective criteria the political consequences
will dictate or at least seem to dictate the decision. And, just as
that would be true in individual cases, so perhaps the whole
proposal to give the courts jurisdiction should be seen as a legislative effort to involve the Judiciary in a frankly political contest
over the balance of power between the Legislative and Executive Branches.
For control over the release of information is a critical factor in the wielding of governmental power. Counsel to the Presi187 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
188 Id. at 200 n.33.
181 See notes 110-14 supra & accompanying text.
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dent apparently judged it unwise to make much of the point in
the litigation over the Watergate tapes, but there is a hint towards the end of one brief: "The right of Presidential confidentiality is not a mystical prerogative. It is, rather, the raw essence
of the Presidential process, the institutionalized recognition of
the crucial role played by human personality in the negotiation,
manipulation, and disposition of human affairs." 9 0
The key word is "manipulation." A President's power to
bomb a small and distant country is greater if the bombing can
be kept secret than if it will be debated in public. If measures
calling for price-control and rationing of fuels were before the
Congress, an announcement of the Arab oil-producing nations'
plan to impose or terminate a boycott could determine the fate
of the legislation. Consider a proposed appropriation to enable
the military to test guided missiles armed with live nuclear warheads by firing them over the western states into the Pacific
Ocean. Public fear and opposition might be quieted if it were
announced that each and every government agency affected
had determined that the chance of mishap was one in a million.
But suppose that it later appeared that a large minority of the
scientists and technicians in each agency had estimated the
chance of mishaps at one in five. Ability to determine what information is released, even within narrow limits, gives enormous power to influence political affairs.
The history reviewed earlier in this article contains little
evidence that the nation has suffered from the want of legal
power to compel the President to satisfy the demands of Congress to information in the Executive Branch. Congress has
powerful political weapons. The assertion of executive privilege
in the Dixon-Yates case led to the defeat of the nomination of
Admiral Strauss to be Secretary of Commerce. 19 1 The threat to
withhold appropriations produced information concerning
mismanagement of foreign aid.1 92 President Kennedy profited
by President Eisenhower's experience and asserted executive
privilege only once; President Johnson allowed it to be invoked
twice by members of his administration.1 93 President Nixon
paid an enormous political price for withholding information
relevant to alleged misconduct in the Executive Branch. Those
19OBrief for Petitioner at 93, Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
191Kramer & Marcuse, supra note 2, at 712-17.
2

19 Id. 827-60.
93 BERGER,

supra note 2, at 252-53 n.107.
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heavy costs, coupled with other vicissitudes, forced even him to
modify other claims of prerogative. President Nixon's experience will surely lead his successors to be much more forthcoming. The political power of Congress vis-h-vis the President
would be even greater if it would exert more organization and
self-discipline.
At this point the constitutional issue tends to blend into the
question of policy. Strictly speaking the constitutional issue
turns upon whether the framework of legal principle within
which the courts would be required to pass particular judgments would be so loose and the political consequences so predominant as to confuse adjudication with political maneuver.
But confusion is a matter of degree, and whether some blending is excessive can hardly be decided without asking whether
the successful assertion of repeated claims of executive privilege is upsetting the constitutional balance between the Legislative and Executive Branches (which also is often a fuzzy question of degree). In terms of legislative policy the question again
boils down to whether the risks and costs of enmeshing the
courts in contests for political advantage are outweighed by the
benefits of providing a method of final resolution of the merits
of claims of executive privilege that would, in at least some
cases, strengthen the power of Congress.
Judging solely from the past, I would be content to see the
Judicial Branch deny its constitutional power and leave questions of executive privilege vis-t-vis Congress to the ebb and
flow of political power.
2.

Modern Need to Invest the Courts with
Enforcement Jurisdiction
Three relatively recent developments furnish persuasive
evidence of a need to increase the power of Congress to compel
the President and others in the Executive Branch to produce
information.
(1) The power of the Presidency has increased enormously
as a result of enduring changes in the conditions that determine
political affairs. The complex interdependence of all parts of
the economy and the shift to affirmative government requires
the formulation of policies and programs far too complex for
initiation or implementation by a purely legislative body. The
very size of the bureaucracy strengthens the President vis- -vis
the Congress. The influence of mass media, especially televi-

1974)

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

sion, and the President's unique degree of power to focus attention upon his acts and words can seldom be equaled by any
Senator or Representative or even by the bodies to which they
belong. In the modern world there is little risk of legislative
tyranny over the Executive.
(2) Claims of executive privilege have become increasingly
frequent. President Eisenhower was the first to claim explicitly
an executive privilege based simply upon an undifferentiated
interest in preserving the confidentiality of deliberations and
advice throughout the Executive Branch. On at least forty-four
other occasions between June 1955 and June 1960 executive officials sought to justify withholding matters from Congress on
grounds of executive privilege, although the claims were often
abandoned. There were only rare claims under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, but President Nixon began making very ex-4
tensive use of the claim before the Watergate investigations. "
If the Executive Branch were left to itself, the practice
would surely grow. Secrecy, if sanctified by a plausible claim of
constitutional privilege, is the easiest solution to a variety of
problems. The claim of privilege is a useful way of hiding inefficiency, maladministration, breach of trust or corruption,
and also a variety of potentially controversial executive practices not authorized by Congress. Ability to control what information to disclose and when to disclose it is a potent political
weapon. The evidence finally released by President Nixon just
prior to his resignation made it abundantly clear that executive
privilege had been used not to protect the Presidency, but to
hide the misconduct of the President himself.
(3) In 1791, when the first amendment was adopted, governmental repression posed the chief threat to an alert and informed electorate. Men could be pretty sute of obtaining the
facts and of communicating with each other in the ways necessary to self-government, provided that men could speak, write
and publish, and associate together without fear of reprisal by
rulers or elected representatives. This condition no longer prevails with respect to many activities of the federal government.
Because of their scale and complexity, coupled with the interdependence of all aspects of society, government itself is often
the chief, if not the only, source of information for the people
about the conduct of those who are supposed to be the people's
194 Id.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1383

agents. The central problem today is how to deal with governmental secrecy and-to be blunt-with governmental deception. A congressional power to inquire, freely exercised, could
help to provide the necessary information.
These trends probably make it desirable to put the force of
law behind some congressional subpoenas addressed to the
President, his aides or other executive officials. Ideally, I think,
the legislative right should prevail in every case in which either
the Senate or House of Representatives votes to override the
Executive's objections, provided that the information is relevant
to a matter which is under inquiry and within the jurisdiction of
the body issuing the subpoena, including its constitutional jurisdiction. A single committee, or subcommittee, because it offers
little guaranty of restraint, is the greatest threat to the values of
confidentiality and carries the great danger of oppression. The
very need for a vote of an entire chamber would not only provide a forum in which the Executive's arguments could be fairly
considered, but the uncertainty of the outcome would press all
concerned to negotiate a resolution. A vote of the entire Senate
or House of Representatives is required to cite a private person
for contempt. The requirement has proved useful in the past. If
either House did vote to require the information, the President
should have no constitutional right to withhold it and the Judiciary should not go behind the voted demand except to decide
questions of relevance and jurisdiction. This would avoid the
difficulty of developing nonpolitical, judicial standards of decision and thus would meet the chief constitutional objection to
other legislative proposals.
There are two putative constitutional obstacles to effectuating this proposal. In United States v. Nixon the Supreme Court
observed of the privilege of confidentiality that "to the extent
that this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers it is constitutionally based."'19 5 The words can and
perhaps should be read as asserting that the privilege is secured
by the Constitution. The right to withhold is readily inferred
from the duties imposed by article 11.196 If this is the proper
meaning, then Congress cannot curtail the privilege and the
Judicial Branch must either determine its applicability or stand
aside upon the ground that the controversy is not justiciable.
19- 94 S. Ct. at 3109.
16 See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
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But the words of article II are not compelling in this respect and
even the Supreme Court's language raises questions. Note that
the Chief Justice chose the words "constitutionally based," not
"constitutionally secured" or "guaranteed by the Constitution."
The diction is certainly not haphazard; elsewhere he used the
phrase "rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." 19 7 In the former case, moreover, the assertion is limited
by the vague qualifier, "to the extent that ... [it] relates to the
effective discharge of a President's powers." '19 8 Furthermore,
there are many cases in which Congress has the constitutional
authority to institute measures that interfere with the "effective
discharge of a President's powers" either by legislation signed
by the President or by enacting a statute over the President's
veto; appropriations acts, measures establishing, abolishing or
reorganizing executive departments, laws defining the powers
of federal agents, and the regulation of administrative procedure will serve as examples. It is entirely possible, therefore,
that the Supreme Court, if squarely confronted with the question, might explain away the assertions in United States v. Nixon
or confine them to situations in which there is no applicable legislation.
It is harder to find an acceptable technique for holding
that a statute can impose upon the President a legal obligation
to comply with a subpoena voted by either the Senate or the
House but cannot give the same force to the subpoena issued
by a committee or subcommittee acting pursuant to a delegation
of power. Perhaps it might be said that the authority to compel
testimony from a coordinate branch of government is "nondelegable." The pronouncement would be a judicial tour de
force, but ipse dixits are often none the worse for that.
B.

Impeachment

History gives no affirmative support to presidential claims
of privilege to withhold information from the House of Representatives while it is considering impeachment. The clearest
statement on the entire subject was made by President Polk:
If the House of Representatives, as the grand inquest
of the nation, should at any time have reason to believe
197 94 S. Ct. at 3107.
98
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that there has been malversation in office by an improper use or application of the public money by a public
officer, and should think proper to institute an inquiry
into the matter, all the archives and papers of the Executive Departments, public or private, would be subject to the inspection and control of a committee of
their body and every facility in the power of the Executive be afforded to enable them to prosecute the investigation.199
President Grant also explicitly acknowledged that the
House "may require as a right in its demand upon the Executive" all the information necessary to discharge its powers of impeachment. 20 0 President Washington in refusing information.
about the Jay Treaty, observed: "It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose
under the cognizance of the House of Representatives, except
that of an impeachment; which the resolution has not expressed. ' 20 1 To read this sentence as an affirmative assertion
that the House would have had a right to the papers in the event
of impeachment would seem a bit forced, but it is proper to recall President Jackson's statement:
[W]here there is the slightest reason to suspect corruption or abuse of trust, no obstacle which I can remove
shall be interposed to prevent the fullest scrutiny by
all legal means. The offices of all the departments will
be opened to you
and every proper facility furnished
20 2
for this purpose.
On principle, the House should have a right to evidence.
The House cannot serve as tie "grand inquest of the nation,"
as the Constitution intends, if the very President whose conduct
of his official duties is under investigation can balk the inquiry
by withholding the recorded evidence of his conduct in the
Executive Branch. The general interest in protecting the confidentiality of internal executive discussions as a means of encouraging candor is surely not as great as the interest in examining charges of executive misconduct serious enough to warrant
'"9 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 55, at 435.

200 7 id. 362.
'" 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (1796).
202 13 CONG. DEB., App. 202 (1837).
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formal consideration of impeachment. The normal reluctance
of the House to launch even an inquiry into the existence of
grounds for impeachment gives enough protection against talking of impeachment merely as a pretext for obtaining information not otherwise available. Although President Nixon and his
counsel have talked vaguely about withholding information
from the House Judiciary Committee in order to preserve the
Presidency, they have never stated how or why the Presidency
would be injured by disclosure in the situation excepted from
any claim of confidentiality by Presidents Washington, Polk,
Cleveland and Theodore Roosevelt.
United States v. Nixon, by force of analogy, gives strong support to the right of the Congress to the evidence. The decision
holds that the public interest in having all relevant and otherwise admissible evidence available at the trial of an indictment
outweighs the generalized interest in the confidentiality of presidential conversations. The public interest in having all relevant and otherwise admissible evidence available in determining whether a President should be charged with "treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours" 20 3 should
therefore likewise outweigh any generalized interest in confidentiality. For surely the public interest in the fair and thorough
investigation of serious wrongs charged against a President himself is at least as important as in the prosecution of his aides.
The only sanction now within legislative control is to assign
the President's withholding of material evidence as a ground
for impeachment. In the North Carolina convention called to
consider ratification of the Constitution, James Iredell, who
later became a Supreme Court Justice, argued in a slightly different context that for the President to give false information or
to withhold full information from the Congress is ground for
impeachment. 0 4 For the House, having authorized a subpoena,
to ignore noncompliance would go far to destroy once and for
all any congressional "right" to obtain information from a President determined to withhold. There were predictions in early
August of this year that the House might not pass the article of
impeachment relating to President Nixon's noncompliance with
Judiciary Committee subpoenas. The importance of that article
203 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
204 4J. ELLIOT, supra note 31,

at 127.

1438

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. f22:1383

is underscored by the fact that President Nixon's resignation
was prompted by the release of some of the very tapes which he
had refused the Committee. However, the resignation obviated
the need for the House to vote on the question, thus postponing
indefinitely any resolution of the scope of executive privilege in
this context.

